Category: Regulatory Watch & Oversight

  • Amtrak Was Born a Fiction, and Fifty Years Later Nobody Has Fixed It

    A For-Profit Company Nobody Believed Would Turn a Profit

    Every government corporation in this series has had to pretend, at some level, to be a real business. Amtrak is the only one where the pretending was written into the planning documents. When Congress drafted the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, internal analysis explicitly described the new National Railroad Passenger Corporation as a corporation organized for profit.

    One of the planners, John McClellan, later admitted what everyone involved already knew: most of the planning team was dubious of the “for profit” claim, but neither the White House nor the more conservative members of Congress were willing to sign off on an entity that was set up from the start to be a perpetual ward of the state, according to an Eno Center for Transportation history of the Act’s drafting.

    Amtrak began operating on May 1, 1971, taking over the common carrier obligations of private railroads that had been losing money on passenger service for decades, in exchange for the right to use those railroads’ tracks at incremental cost, according to the Federal Railroad Administration. It has never once turned a profit in fifty five years of operation, and the fight over whose fault that is has been running, essentially unchanged, for almost the entire time.

    The Same Question, Asked Since 1979

    GAO has been auditing Amtrak’s finances since the agency’s early years, and the title of its 1979 review says everything: Should AMTRAK’s Highly Unprofitable Routes Be Discontinued? By 1995, GAO was still laying out the same three options it always lays out: eliminate the subsidy and privatize the railroad, which GAO itself conceded was unlikely to work because no Amtrak route earns enough revenue to cover its own costs and few private firms would take on that risk; realign the national route network around the most cost effective corridors; or keep funding the whole thing and hope efficiency gains eventually close the gap.

    They never have. By 1998, GAO found Amtrak had consumed roughly 21 billion dollars in federal operating and capital funding since 1971 while reducing its annual net loss only marginally, from 834 million dollars in fiscal year 1994 to 762 million in fiscal year 1997, with losses already projected to climb back toward 845 million the following year.

    By 2020, cumulative federal subsidies to Amtrak had passed 50 billion dollars, according to a policy analysis from the Cato Institute — a figure that predates the 2021 infrastructure law’s further 66 billion dollars in rail funding, part of it going directly to Amtrak and part to state rail grants. No independent source has published a clean post-2021 cumulative total, in part because the infrastructure law’s Amtrak-specific allocations are disbursed over time and tracked separately from annual operating subsidies.

    The 2025 to 2026 reauthorization debate is, structurally, the same conversation GAO was already having in 1979: current testimony from the Department of Transportation cites GAO findings that long-distance routes account for 15 percent of Amtrak’s riders but 80 percent of its financial losses, and calls once again for ending subsidies to underperforming long-distance service and separating Northeast Corridor infrastructure into its own governance structure.

    The Ledger That Blames the Trains Nobody in Washington Rides

    Here is where it gets genuinely strange, because Amtrak’s own numbers do not agree with themselves. Amtrak’s internal accounting system, called Amtrak Performance Tracking, assigned the Northeast Corridor a 352 million dollar above the rail profit in fiscal year 2025, while attributing a 622 million dollar loss to the long-distance inter-regional routes that serve the rest of the country, the same routes GAO and DOT keep flagging as the problem.

    But a Trains Magazine analysis argues this allocation runs essentially backwards, and it quotes two former Amtrak chiefs to make the point. Former CEO Wick Moorman told Congress in writing that eliminating the entire long-distance network would actually increase Amtrak’s total loss and subsidy requirement by 435 million dollars a year, meaning those routes are net contributors once the Northeast Corridor’s fixed costs are honestly allocated rather than parked somewhere else in the ledger.

    Former Amtrak President David Gunn reportedly went further, warning that if Congress ever gave Amtrak less than its full subsidy request, the railroad would have to close the Northeast Corridor before it touched the long-distance routes.

    Whether or not you buy the full argument, the fact that Amtrak’s own former leadership and Amtrak’s own official accounting cannot agree on which half of the network is actually losing money, after fifty five years and one accounting system built for exactly this purpose, tells you something about how useful that accounting system actually is for anyone trying to make an honest funding decision.

    It also tells you who benefits from the current framing. That is, the Northeast Corridor serves the members of Congress who appropriate Amtrak’s budget every year, and an accounting method that quietly shields it from scrutiny while pointing the finger at rural long-distance service is, at minimum, a very convenient place for the numbers to land.

    Fifty Billion Dollars and Counting

    Even the number Amtrak takes to Congress each year is a chosen number rather than a neutral one. Amtrak requests funding based on what it calls its adjusted operating loss, 598.4 million dollars in fiscal year 2025, a figure that specifically excludes roughly a billion dollars a year in depreciation, 364 million dollars in capital project planning costs, and hundreds of millions more in expenses that sit on the operating side of the ledger under ordinary accounting rules but that Amtrak has decided are not relevant to the number it wants Congress to see.

    None of this makes Amtrak unique in wanting to look better on paper than it is. What makes it worth closing this series’ current stretch on is how openly the fiction was built in from day one. TVA and the RFC grew into unaccountable financial structures over time, as the incentives shifted. The FDIC‘s clean design cracked under a genuine stress test nobody had planned for.

    Amtrak was chartered as a for-profit corporation by people who wrote down, at the time, that they did not believe it would be profitable, because admitting the truth would have meant admitting they were building a permanent federal dependent. Fifty five years, more than 50 billion dollars in direct subsidies before the 2021 infrastructure law, and one internal accounting system whose own former executives cannot agree with it later, that is exactly what they built.

    Next in this series: the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the quiet federal backstop between millions of workers and the pension promises their employers could not keep.

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  • Federal Register Watch: October 7, 2026

    Wednesday’s Federal Register, Volume 91, Number 193, ran 148 numbered pages, and the headline rules were mostly absent. What the issue offered instead was a cluster of privacy notices in which three federal agencies described, in their own words, new or enlarged piles of personal data. The Treasury Department is assembling a file on student borrowers, the Justice Department is building a firearms rights database and asking to keep it largely closed to the people in it, and the Drug Enforcement Administration is widening who counts as a subject of its aviation records. The Labor Department, meanwhile, abandoned a rulemaking it spent fifteen months not finishing.

    Treasury Takes the Student Loan File

    The most consequential item is easy to miss because it carries a dull name. Treasury’s notice of a new system of records, Department of the Treasury .033, covers Federal Student Aid portfolio research, analysis, oversight, reporting and compliance records. Under an interagency agreement, the Education Department will hand Treasury data, including personally identifiable information, on recipients of federal student grants and loans under Title IV of the Higher Education Act. The notice names three Education sources, the National Student Loan Data System, the Default Management Collection System and the Enterprise Data Management and Analytics Platform Services, and it concedes that some of the data may come from education records protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The Office of the Fiscal Assistant Secretary and the Office of Economic Policy will run it.

    The categories of records are broad. Treasury lists loan origination, disbursement, repayment, default, collection, discharge and consolidation data, plus application and eligibility information such as dependency, income and household details. The people covered include borrowers, co-signers, endorsers, parents and spouses, along with anyone who files an inquiry or complaint. Treasury says it will use the material for research, modeling, forecasting, audit coordination and responses to oversight bodies, and it promises role based access controls, audit logging and periodic access reviews. Education remains the custodian of the underlying program records, but Treasury wants its own single system anyway, because the records serve one Treasury mission under one governance framework.

    One purpose deserves a second look. The tenth listed purpose is to support program transition, implementation, reporting and closeout activities tied to the transfer, ownership, administration, oversight or management of the portfolio. What follows is an inference and not a statement in the notice. The wording suggests Treasury expects some part of the student aid portfolio to change hands or change managers, and it is building the paper trail before the move. The reasoning rests only on that purpose line and on the notice’s repeated references to Treasury’s ownership and administration responsibilities, and the notice never says a transfer is planned. Comments are due November 6 under docket TREAS-DO-2026-0628. The notice lists no Privacy Act exemptions for the system, which makes it a useful contrast with the next item.

    A Second Chance With the Blinds Drawn

    The Office of the Pardon Attorney published two companion documents. One is a notice of a new system of records, the Firearms Rights Restoration Electronic Records Database. The other is a proposed rule exempting that database from parts of the Privacy Act. The database will receive, track and adjudicate applications under 18 U.S.C. 925(c), which lets people barred from possessing firearms ask the Attorney General for relief. The notice explains that since 1992 Congress has restricted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives from spending its appropriated funds on those investigations, which left the program unusable, and that the Attorney General withdrew ATF’s delegation in March 2025 after reviewing the matter under Executive Order 14206. A final rule on the application process followed in August 2026.

    The records will live on the FBI’s Electronic Departmental Order service inside the Next Generation Identification system, and the database will interface with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. Justice proposes to claim exemptions under subsections (j)(2) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, the law enforcement provisions, from several requirements, including the rights to request access to and amendment of one’s own records. The stated reasons are that notice, access and amendment would reveal the nature and scope of the adjudication, chill candid communication among officials advising the Attorney General, and expose people who gave information under a promise of confidentiality. Those are real interests. They are also bought with the applicant’s own access and correction rights, which is what the exemption does by its terms. Comments on both documents are due November 6.

    Down the page, the DEA republished and retitled its aviation records system as the DEA Aviation Division Reporting System, last published in full in 2000. The old notice covered pilots. The revision adds DEA employees and contractors, vendors, detainees, inmates, non-DEA law enforcement personnel and other federal employees and contractors, and it updates the record categories, purposes and routine uses. Comments are due November 5. The addition of detainees and inmates suggests the system now tracks passengers as well as crews, an inference drawn only from the expanded list of covered individuals.

    Labor Declines to Move Its Furniture

    The Wage and Hour Division withdrew a proposed rule it published on July 2, 2025, which would have removed from the Code of Federal Regulations the Fair Labor Standards Act interpretive parts that were never issued or amended through notice and comment. The idea was to demote those parts to subregulatory guidance posted elsewhere. The comment period ran 30 days. The Department received six substantive comments, two in favor and four opposed, and it denied 10 requests for more time. Fifteen months later, Administrator Andrew B. Rogers signed the withdrawal, which took effect October 6.

    The stated reason is that further action no longer aligns with the Department’s needs, priorities and objectives, a sentence that could justify almost any abandoned project. The notice adds that commenters raised concerns about the effect on specific industries and that the Department will keep looking for ways to modernize its interpretive guidance. For employers and workers who rely on those parts, the practical result is that the guidance stays exactly where it was.

    The Rest of the Docket

    The Federal Reserve extended the comment period on its Regulation O proposal by 30 days, to November 4, after commenters asked for more time. The August 4 proposal would update the rule on loans by member banks to their insiders, index outdated dollar thresholds, and address how the rule applies to banks that lend to companies presumed to be controlled by large asset managers through passive investment funds. The Copyright Office opened a notice of inquiry on music streaming fraud at the request of Representative Scott Fitzgerald of the House Judiciary Committee, with comments due November 23 and replies December 21. The notice puts domestic streaming revenue for sound recordings at about $9.5 billion.

    The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative confirmed that the two 2018 Section 301 actions on China did not terminate on their four year anniversaries, because domestic industry representatives asked that they continue, and the statutory review goes on. The Department of Energy withdrew the appendix B test procedure for commercial warm air furnaces in a final rule, finding an uncertain gain in representativeness that did not outweigh the burden. The IRS asked for comments, due December 7, on its information collection for Trump Account elections. The Office of Special Counsel published a notice naming the members of its Senior Executive Service Performance Board, and sanctions actions from the Office of Foreign Assets Control filled 17 pages. The only presidential document was Proclamation 11071, designating National Manufacturing Day.

  • Federal Register Watch: October 6, 2026

    Tuesday’s Federal Register, Volume 91, Number 192, ran 630 pages, and three documents account for 424 of them. Two are Securities and Exchange Commission proposals, one on crypto custody and one on who may charge performance fees, and the third is a 120-page final rule on health insurance price transparency. The more revealing material sits in the margins, where FinCEN retired two proposals that would have watched crypto move and the Treasury Department shielded a new fraud tip line from the Privacy Act.

    Self-Custody, Now With Paperwork

    Start with the SEC’s proposal on adviser and fund custody rules and crypto custody rules, which runs 234 pages and takes comments until December 7. The core idea is that a registered investment adviser could hold a client’s crypto itself when no permitted custodian is available, provided the adviser documents that finding in writing at the outset and again every quarter. The release adds conditions. The adviser must mitigate cybersecurity risks and review its controls at least annually, and it must obtain internal control reports within six months and yearly after that. A fund’s board would have to decide, before the adviser takes possession and annually afterward, that the asset would receive reasonable care in the adviser’s hands.

    It is a tidy structure, and the release is candid about why custody rules exist. It recounts that when the adviser and the custodian are the same party, the adviser can move the assets directly, and that a separate custodian’s account statement is what discourages unauthorized trading. The proposal then builds a path for the adviser to be both. The justification is practical and not frivolous. The SEC says custodians cannot support every token, that new assets may have no custodian at all, and that state trust companies have been unsure whether they count as banks, a problem staff addressed with a September 2025 no-action letter. The release also leans on the Crypto Task Force the commission created in January 2025 and on Executive Order 14178. A safeguard that rests on the fox’s quarterly memo about the henhouse is still a safeguard, technically. The comment file will show whether it is a good one.

    Its companion, Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, would widen who may pay advisers a share of capital gains. It would expand the arrangement for registered funds and business development companies under conditions, and it would extend the exemption to investors who meet the Regulation D accredited investor definition. Comments are also due December 7. The SEC expects the change to let a wider range of advisers offer regulated funds and to put more strategies inside them. Whether shareholders were asking for more performance fees is a question the comment file will answer.

    The Mixers Are Forgiven

    Pages 63513 to 63515 hold the day’s best contrast. FinCEN withdrew its 2023 proposal to treat international crypto mixing as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern, and it separately withdrew a 2020 proposal on transactions involving unhosted wallets. The mixing rule would have required covered financial institutions to report mixing transactions, with customer identity details attached. The wallet proposal would have required reports and identity verification above $10,000, and recordkeeping above $3,000, when a counterparty used an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet.

    The stated reasons come in two registers. On mixers, FinCEN cites commenters’ concern that the definition was broad enough to chill legitimate activity and burden institutions, and it points to a July 2025 report from the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, which said the administration supports lawful users transacting privately on public blockchains. In the same notice the agency concedes that illicit actors still use mixers to hinder investigations and says it will keep monitoring. On wallets, the explanation is that withdrawal is part of making digital asset rules fit for purpose, and FinCEN will take no further action. Deputy Director Jimmy L. Kirby signed both.

    Set that beside the SEC’s custody proposal and the day has a theme. The government is making room for crypto to be held, and moved, with fewer questions put to the people doing the moving. Each agency has reasons, and some of them are good. But the same Tuesday that loosens one reporting net shows the Treasury Department weaving another, which brings us to the third item.

    A Tip Line With a Privacy Shield

    Treasury’s final rule on Privacy Act exemptions concerns a new system of records, Treasury .032, for Federal Program Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Tip Intake and Referral Records. The system will take in tips from the public, agencies, contractors and grant recipients about suspected fraud, improper payments and misuse of federal funds, then triage them and refer them to other agencies and inspectors general. Treasury exempts the system from certain Privacy Act provisions under the law enforcement investigatory material provision, effective November 5, and cites Executive Orders 14249 and 14395 as the policy backing.

    Treasury received two comments on its June proposal. One called the exemptions overly broad and raised transparency and oversight concerns. The other supported protecting genuine investigatory material but urged Treasury to narrow the exemption and preserve protections for records that are not law enforcement related. Treasury kept the exemptions, and says they do not reach every record merely because it sits in the system. That is a fair limit on paper. In practice a tip line is where a neighbor’s grudge and a real fraud look identical at intake, which is exactly the stage at which access and correction rights matter most.

    Three other privacy filings ran the same morning, and they are mostly housekeeping. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission republished 13 systems of records notices after a comprehensive review, with four (NRC 27, 36, 39 and 40) substantively revised and comments due November 5. The National Archives is revising NARA 44, its reasonable accommodation records, to cover pregnancy and childbirth requests under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act and to move some processing into a web based application. The FDIC rescinded two applicant recruiting systems because an Office of Personnel Management government-wide notice already covers them.

    The Rest of the Docket

    The 120-page Transparency in Coverage final rule, a joint product of the IRS, the Labor Department’s benefits arm and CMS, takes effect December 7. Citing Executive Order 14221, it adds contextual files and data elements such as product type and network name to the machine-readable pricing files, changes the level at which data is aggregated, lengthens the reporting period and lowers the claims threshold for out-of-network historical data, trims reporting frequency, and requires pricing information to be available by phone.

    The FDA opened a request for information on ibogaine trial design, covering dose escalation, care setting, safety monitoring and stopping rules, and noted that HHS is funding development and that the first federally supported trials are expected to enroll adults with opioid use disorder and adults with PTSD. Comments are due November 20. The agency also issued device rules classifying a hyperoxia monitor used with pulse oximetry, a focused ultrasound system for non-thermal tissue ablation and a high throughput DNA sequencing test for hereditary cancer predisposition, plus an exemption for certain clinical toxicology test systems.

    The remainder includes NHTSA and NTIA eliminating obsolete 911 grant program regulations, a NHTSA request for information on prehospital blood transfusion, HUD‘s 2027 designation of Difficult Development Areas and Qualified Census Tracts, the SEC’s acknowledgment of ICE Futures U.S. filing Form 1-N under Section 6(g) to register as a national securities exchange, a NOAA final rule under Amendment 62 raising Gulf of America red grouper catch limits, effective October 2, an EPA Notice of Availability seeking comment on initial air quality designations under the 2024 revised annual PM2.5 standard, which tightened the annual limit to 9.0 micrograms per cubic meter and carries a 30-day public comment period, and 15 pages of OFAC sanctions actions. The issue carried no presidential documents and no executive orders.

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  • The Postal Service Passed Its Pay Audit. The Bill Just Got Postponed.

    Credit where it is due. The Postal Service Office of Inspector General reviewed the compensation, benefits, and bonus authority of 158 postal officers and executives for calendar year 2025 and found nothing to flag. No one exceeded the Executive Schedule Level 1 salary cap of $250,600. None of the eleven employees the Board designated as “critical senior executive” positions cleared 120 percent of the Vice President’s compensation, the $347,280 ceiling PAEA allows for a maximum of twelve such slots. The auditors made zero recommendations. Management, for its part, declined to comment, which in bureaucratic terms is the sound of an agency that has nothing to argue about.

    A Rare Clean Bill

    This is not nothing. The OIG’s CY2020 audit found a $5,833 monetary impact from noncompliance, a rounding error by federal standards but a finding nonetheless. This year there is no finding at all. The Postal Service is, in the narrow and specific sense that this audit measures, playing by its own rules. A watchdog publication built on the premise that institutions rarely get audited into a compliment owes it to its readers to say so when one does.

    But an audit that measures compliance with a cap is not the same as an audit that asks whether the cap means anything. It measures whether water stayed inside the container. It does not ask what happens to the water that would have overflowed.

    The Account That Never Closes

    Buried in Table 2 of the report, well past the highlight box that most readers will stop at, is the answer. When an executive’s earned compensation would push them over their statutory ceiling, the Postal Service does not simply withhold it. It defers it into an interest bearing account and pays it out later, in whatever future year the executive’s total compensation happens to sit below the cap.

    Deputy Postmaster General Douglas Tulino, who also holds the titles of Chief Operating Officer and Chief Human Resources Officer, a three hat arrangement that ought to raise its own eyebrows, deferred $198,650 in calendar year 2025 alone. His running balance sits at $515,462.18. Joseph Corbett is carrying a deferred balance of $538,887.66. David Steiner, the Postmaster General, has $86,695 sitting in the same holding pattern. This is not back pay owed for work not yet done. It is compensation already earned, already valued, simply held in escrow until the calendar catches up to the paycheck.

    The Office of Legal Counsel blessed this arrangement back in 2013, and the Postal Service formalized it in an August 2023 pay policy. It is legal in the fullest sense of the word. It is also, functionally, a way of making a hard salary cap into a soft one. The cap does not limit what an executive is paid. It limits when.

    Twelve Chairs, One Very Full Ledger

    The PAEA’s critical positions exception exists for a defensible reason, the argument that the Postal Service competes for executive talent against private logistics firms that pay considerably more than the federal government ever will. Fair enough. But the mechanism built to enforce a ceiling on that competition has, in practice, become a mechanism for deferring rather than denying the money that would breach it.

    Consider the company those eleven names keep. Chief Retail and Delivery Officer. Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer. Chief Technology Officer. Chief Information Officer. General Counsel. These are, by any measure, executive suite jobs at a nine figure operating budget, and the audit confirms their occupants are being compensated like it, just with the accounting spread across tax years instead of concentrated into one that would trip the wire.

    None of this requires a conspiracy. It requires only that a statutory salary cap, once it collides with an actual executive compensation market, gets engineered around rather than enforced. The engineering happens to be perfectly legal, transparently disclosed in an annual report, and blessed by the Justice Department. That is precisely what makes it a story rather than a scandal. Scandals get investigated and end. This just continues, one interest bearing dollar at a time.

    Solvency for Me, Not for Thee

    Here is the number that belongs next to Table 2, and does not appear anywhere in the OIG’s report because it was outside the audit’s scope. The Postal Service closed fiscal year 2025 with a net loss of $9.0 billion under GAAP, an improvement over the $9.5 billion loss the year before only in the sense that a slower car crash is still a car crash. Controllable loss, the figure USPS itself prefers because it excludes costs management says it cannot influence, still came in at $2.7 billion, up nearly a billion dollars from the prior year. Compensation and benefits expense across the organization rose $1.7 billion year over year, the single largest driver working against the modest revenue gains from Ground Advantage and stamp price increases.

    Postmaster General Steiner told the public in November that “the occasional appearance of financial progress is far outweighed by the reality of our significant systemic annual revenue and cost imbalance,” and asked Congress for changes to pension funding rules, the statutory debt ceiling, and workers’ compensation administration. He is not wrong that the agency’s finances are structurally broken. It is worth noting, in the same breath, that while the institution pleads for relief from Congress, its own compensation ledger keeps a small number of executives’ pay intact, merely rescheduled, interest accruing the whole time.

    The Postal Service passed its compliance audit. It deserves to be told so plainly. But compliance with a cap that bends rather than breaks is a different achievement than the audit’s clean headline suggests, and an agency nine billion dollars in the red is not obviously the place where “we will pay you later, with interest” should be standard operating procedure for the corner office.

    For more USPS OIG coverage, see Nashville’s Postal Honor System Just Failed an Audit — on four OIG reports finding that the compliance data Nashville reported to USPS headquarters bore little relationship to what auditors found on the floor — and The Pantry That Held a Federal Problem, on a joint OIG-DEA investigation that dismantled a drug distribution network running through the postal system.

  • The Fund That Worked Until It Almost Didn’t: FDIC, 2023, and the Return of the Bank Run

    The Slogan With an Asterisk

    The FDIC’s marketing has one genuinely remarkable claim behind it: since the agency opened its doors in 1934, no depositor has ever lost a penny of insured deposits. It is the rare piece of government messaging that happens to be true. It is also, on its own, a slightly misleading way to describe what actually happened in March 2023, when the failure of three regional banks forced federal regulators to quietly abandon the very insurance limit the FDIC exists to enforce.

    Of the entities covered so far in this series, the FDIC comes closest to the textbook version of a government corporation Congress imagined when it wrote the 1945 Government Corporation Control Act: funded entirely by risk based premiums on the industry it regulates, receiving no annual appropriations, and repaying its initial seed capital rather than leaning on the kind of soft, interest free financing that let TVA and the RFC balloon into open ended liabilities. That design held up for ninety years. Then three banks failed inside two weeks, and the difference between “the FDIC works” and “the FDIC has discretion to decide who actually gets protected” became very hard to ignore.

    The Cleanest Design in the Series, Almost

    The FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933 after more than 9,000 banks failed between the 1929 crash and 1933, wiping out roughly 1.3 billion dollars in depositor losses, according to the FDIC’s own institutional history. Congress gave it an initial 289 million dollar loan from the Treasury to get started, a debt the agency subsequently repaid in full. Since then, the FDIC has funded its operations entirely through insurance premiums charged to member banks and earnings on its Treasury securities holdings, a structure the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis has noted receives no congressional appropriations at all, which puts the FDIC closer to actually behaving like the self-sustaining commercial entity every government corporation is nominally supposed to be.

    That design worked exactly as intended for eight decades, through the savings and loan crisis and the 2008 financial crisis alike. Then, on March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank failed, followed within days by Signature Bank and, weeks later, First Republic, together the second, third, and fourth worst bank failures in American history, according to reporting on the FDIC’s own inspector general findings. GAO later found that the Federal Reserve and FDIC had identified concerns about both SVB and Signature Bank as far back as 2018, but neither regulator escalated those concerns into formal enforcement action in time to force a fix before the banks collapsed. The FDIC itself estimated the failures would cost the Deposit Insurance Fund roughly 18.7 billion dollars, the bulk of it tied not to ordinary insured deposits but to the decision to protect deposits above the standard 250,000 dollar insurance limit entirely.

    The Limit That Got Overridden Anyway

    That decision is the part worth sitting with. Federal law lets Treasury invoke a systemic risk exception, on the joint recommendation of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, to cover deposits beyond the statutory cap when a bank failure threatens the wider financial system. GAO reviewed the invocation for SVB and Signature Bank and concluded the decision likely helped prevent broader instability, noting that deposit outflows from smaller banks slowed within a week of the emergency action. In other words, the mechanism worked. But the mechanism only exists because the ordinary insurance limit, the thing depositors are told to rely on and the thing the premium structure is actually priced around, turned out not to be sufficient the moment a bank run could happen at the speed of a group chat rather than a physical line outside a branch.

    The FDIC’s own inspector general did not let the agency off easy afterward. A review released in December 2024 found the FDIC’s readiness to resolve large regional bank failures was, in the OIG’s words, not sufficiently mature to facilitate a consistently efficient crisis response, citing gaps in staffing, technology, and coordination across divisions. The OIG issued eleven recommendations, and the same reporting noted GAO’s own parallel review found FDIC lacked even a centralized system for tracking supervisory recommendations across its own examiners, meaning emerging risks at supervised banks could fall through cracks nobody was specifically watching for.

    Deregulating the Morning After

    Here is where the story takes a turn that fits uncomfortably well with the rest of this series. Rather than responding to that OIG report with a tightening of supervisory practice, the FDIC’s new leadership moved in the opposite direction. Travis Hill, installed as acting chairman on January 20, 2025, moved quickly to reshape the agency’s regulatory posture. Within weeks, he rescinded the FDIC’s 2024 Statement of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions and withdrew four other pending regulatory proposals, part of what one law firm’s analysis described as a wholesale regulatory purge. The stated goal was making merger review faster and more predictable for the banking industry. The practical effect was that the same agency whose own watchdog had just flagged coordination and readiness failures in the run up to 2023 spent its next chapter loosening the review process for the kind of consolidation that produces exactly the large, complex institutions whose failures are hardest to manage. Hill, confirmed by the Senate as the agency’s 23rd chairman in December 2025 and sworn in the following January, had by then already set the agency’s direction.

    This is not corruption or mismanagement in the way the RFC’s cronyism was, and it is not the multi-decade debt spiral TVA has been running twice now. It is something quieter: a genuinely well designed, self-funded government corporation discovering that even its cleanest structural feature, premium funded insurance with a hard dollar cap, still depends on a discretionary political judgment call about who gets bailed out beyond that cap when the alternative looks worse. The FDIC did not need a conservatorship. It needed an emergency exception to its own rules within days of a crisis starting, which is a smaller version of the same problem.

    Why It Matters

    Every entity in this series so far has hit the same wall from a different direction. The RFC discovered that market discretion without oversight curdles into cronyism. Fannie and Freddie discovered that dodging the 1945 Act’s accountability regime just moves the risk somewhere less visible until it detonates. TVA discovered that a debt ceiling only constrains behavior for as long as Congress declines to raise it, which turns out to be not very long at all. The FDIC, built about as well as a government corporation can be built, discovered that the line between “self-funded insurance program” and “implicit federal guarantee” gets redrawn the moment enough money is at stake, and that the agency meant to price and contain that risk can still be caught flat footed by how fast it moves in an era of instant digital withdrawals.

    None of this means deposit insurance is a bad idea, any more than TVA’s debt history means public power is a bad idea. It means the closest thing this series has found to a genuine success story still needed an emergency override within its first real stress test in fifteen years, and that the policy response since has been to loosen the very oversight machinery that watchdog after watchdog just said was not ready. Whichever government corporation this series covers next, that is the question worth asking of it: not whether the design looks sound on paper, but what happens the first week the design gets tested for real.

    Next in the series: Amtrak, the only government corporation here whose founding fiction was written into the planning documents on day one — by the same planners who privately doubted it.

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  • Who Decides When a Quantum Computer Actually Works?

    The Quantum Genesis Files, Part Four

    Washington has spent years funding quantum computers, testing them and listening to companies explain what their machines can do. Now DOE is building an apparatus to decide when one of them has actually delivered.

    Building a fault-tolerant quantum computer is difficult.

    Determining that someone has built one may prove surprisingly complicated too.

    That problem sits quietly underneath the Department of Energy’s new Quantum Genesis Q Competition.

    DOE wants private companies to demonstrate quantum computers with at least 100 logical qubits, hundreds of millions of fault-tolerant operations and scientific applications worthy of the Department’s research mission.

    Reach those milestones and substantial federal money becomes available.

    But first somebody has to verify the milestones.

    That means determining whether logical qubits are really behaving logically, whether error rates are low enough, whether operations can be repeated reliably and whether a supposedly useful scientific computation actually represents something conventional computers cannot reasonably accomplish.

    DOE has decided not to leave those judgments entirely to the companies building the machines.

    The Department is building referees.

    The $45 Million Referee

    When DOE announced the Quantum Genesis Q Competition on September 17, the $215 million competition naturally received most of the attention.

    Sitting beside it was another announcement.

    DOE plans to spend up to $45 million establishing a Quantum High-Performance Computing Validation and Verification Testbed through its National Laboratories.

    Fourteen million dollars is available from fiscal year 2026 funding. The remaining planned funding depends upon future congressional appropriations.

    Its assignment is remarkably broad.

    DOE says the testbed must be capable of characterizing and validating the entire quantum-computing stack.

    That includes physical hardware.

    Quantum gates.

    Logical architectures.

    Algorithms and applications.

    Classical control systems.

    The testbed will support the Q Competition, meaning companies seeking milestone payments will face something more substantial than a review of specifications supplied by their own engineers.

    DOE wants independent evidence.

    The Department is effectively spending money to answer a question that has followed quantum computing almost from its beginning.

    What exactly should count as success?

    Qubits Make Terrible Scoreboards

    Traditional computers are comparatively easy to describe.

    Processor speeds, memory, storage and standardized benchmark tests can provide imperfect but reasonably understandable comparisons.

    Quantum computers are another matter.

    Two machines can contain similar numbers of physical qubits while having dramatically different capabilities.

    One architecture may produce excellent individual gate fidelity while struggling with connectivity.

    Another may possess more qubits but suffer from errors that limit useful circuit depth.

    A machine may perform impressively on one specialized benchmark and considerably less impressively on another.

    Even the same quantum processor can produce different results depending upon calibration, software, circuit compilation and the expertise of the person operating it.

    That makes simple qubit counts a particularly poor substitute for useful performance.

    The federal government has known this for years.

    And some of its laboratories have been trying to solve the measurement problem long before Quantum Genesis existed.

    Sandia Has Been Building Yardsticks

    At Sandia National Laboratories, the Quantum Performance Laboratory has made quantum-computer assessment its business.

    The laboratory develops methods for measuring how quantum hardware actually performs.

    Its researchers study failure mechanisms, devise performance metrics, build predictive models and create protocols for testing experimental processors.

    They also develop and maintain pyGSTi, an open-source software package used to characterize quantum processors.

    Most importantly for Quantum Genesis, Sandia says the laboratory provides quantum-hardware assessment capabilities directly to DOE and the federal government.

    That makes Sandia’s work particularly relevant to the new competition.

    The Quantum Performance Laboratory has been publishing research on subjects such as randomized benchmarking, gate-set tomography, application-oriented benchmarks and fault-tolerance thresholds for years.

    Those terms may sound painfully specialized.

    Their purpose is relatively straightforward.

    A manufacturer can say a quantum processor performs at a certain level.

    Someone else needs a scientifically defensible way to check.

    Sandia has spent years developing the ruler.

    Oak Ridge Tried Measuring the Machines

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory approached the problem from another direction.

    Its Quantum Computing User Program has provided researchers access to commercial quantum computers from multiple companies.

    That arrangement allowed scientists to do something especially useful.

    They could compare machines.

    In 2023, Oak Ridge researchers reported what the laboratory described as the first independent comparison of leading quantum computers.

    The team examined 24 quantum processors.

    They then compared their results against performance figures promoted by vendors including IBM, Rigetti and Quantinuum.

    The exercise demonstrated precisely why verification matters.

    Most machines performed reasonably close to the vendors’ reported capabilities.

    But researchers had difficulty reproducing the highest advertised performance figures consistently.

    That did not mean the vendors were lying.

    Oak Ridge’s researchers explicitly cautioned against that conclusion.

    Manufacturers know their machines extraordinarily well and can optimize their hardware in ways ordinary users may not reproduce.

    That distinction may sound minor.

    For Quantum Genesis, it is enormous.

    DOE is not paying for the performance a manufacturer’s best engineers can coax from a carefully optimized demonstration.

    It is trying to determine whether a machine represents a scientifically useful computing capability.

    Those are not necessarily the same standard.

    DARPA Is Asking an Even Harder Question

    The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has developed its own verification system.

    DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative is trying to determine whether any current quantum-computing approach can reach what the agency calls utility-scale operation by 2033.

    Its definition is intentionally economic as well as technical.

    The computational value of the machine must exceed its cost.

    Companies move through three stages.

    Stage A asks whether the company has a plausible concept.

    Stage B requires a detailed research and development plan, identification of technical risks and prototypes designed to reduce those risks.

    Then comes Stage C.

    At that point, a government verification-and-validation team determines whether the proposed utility-scale computer can actually be constructed as designed and operated as intended.

    DARPA describes the program as independent third-party verification.

    That distinction matters.

    The agency is not trying to crown the best quantum company.

    It says explicitly that the Quantum Benchmarking Initiative is not a competition intended to narrow the industry to a predetermined group of winners.

    Multiple approaches could succeed.

    One could succeed.

    None could succeed.

    The job of the government evaluators is to determine which claims survive examination.

    Two Federal Finish Lines

    DARPA and DOE are therefore examining related questions with different finish lines.

    DARPA is asking whether a company can build an industrially useful quantum computer by 2033.

    DOE wants scientifically relevant fault-tolerant quantum computing beginning around 2028.

    DOE’s target is tied to scientific utility.

    DARPA’s is tied to utility at industrial scale.

    The distinction creates an interesting federal experiment.

    A company could theoretically demonstrate a machine valuable for certain DOE scientific applications before proving that the same technological architecture can become economically useful at industrial scale.

    That makes Quantum Genesis something other than a miniature version of DARPA’s program.

    The agencies are measuring different stages in the evolution of the technology.

    They are also developing independent government expertise rather than accepting industry roadmaps at face value.

    The Government Is Learning How to Say No

    That may be the least glamorous but most important part of the entire Quantum Genesis story.

    Federal quantum policy has spent years asking how government can accelerate the technology.

    Fund research.

    Create national centers.

    Connect companies with laboratories.

    Purchase commercial hardware access.

    Support domestic manufacturing.

    Develop algorithms.

    Train scientists.

    Those activities help technology move forward.

    Verification serves a different purpose.

    It gives the government the ability to say no.

    No, that qubit count does not demonstrate useful performance.

    No, that benchmark does not prove fault tolerance.

    No, that scientific calculation does not yet represent meaningful advantage.

    No, that roadmap has not sufficiently addressed the engineering risks.

    Or eventually, perhaps, yes.

    Without an independent ability to make those judgments, a government quantum program risks becoming dependent upon the companies seeking its money to explain whether their own machines deserve it.

    DOE appears determined to avoid that arrangement.

    From Laboratory Instrument to Federal Infrastructure

    The Department’s ambitions extend beyond the current competition.

    Its 2026 roadmap envisions quantum processors eventually becoming part of DOE’s broader scientific-computing infrastructure.

    That means quantum machines would operate alongside conventional high-performance computers rather than replacing them.

    Researchers could move portions of scientific workloads onto quantum processors when those processors offer an advantage.

    DOE ultimately envisions a dedicated Quantum Computing User Facility built around that hybrid model.

    That changes the stakes of verification.

    The Department is not merely evaluating prototypes for a technology prize.

    It is potentially deciding what equipment eventually belongs inside the federal scientific-computing enterprise.

    DOE already operates some of the most powerful conventional supercomputers in the world.

    If quantum processors are going to become another instrument in that infrastructure, the Department needs to know not merely whether they work.

    It needs to know when they are useful.

    The Bureaucracy Behind the Breakthrough

    Quantum computing is often presented through images of exotic hardware, gold-colored cryogenic equipment and promises about calculations that would take conventional supercomputers longer than the age of the universe.

    The less photogenic part of the story involves measurement protocols, error models, validation plans, benchmark suites and federal scientists asking manufacturers to run the test again.

    That may ultimately matter just as much.

    The Quantum Genesis Q Competition is attempting to push private companies toward a fault-tolerant machine.

    The new DOE validation testbed will try to determine whether they get there.

    Sandia has spent years developing quantum-performance measurements.

    Oak Ridge has spent years putting commercial processors in front of independent scientific users.

    DARPA has built a staged process for dissecting company roadmaps and eventually verifying complete systems.

    Different agencies and laboratories are approaching the problem from different directions.

    But they are converging on the same principle.

    Extraordinary technological claims require considerably more than extraordinary press releases.

    They require somebody with a ruler.

    The Race Begins

    That brings the first four Quantum Genesis Files full circle.

    Part One followed the decade of DOE research that preceded the new $215 million competition.

    Part Two followed the federal money that helped construct the broader quantum ecosystem.

    Part Three mapped many of the companies and architectures already familiar to federal laboratories and evaluators.

    And Part Four arrives at the people responsible for deciding whether any of it actually works.

    The next major event is October 19, when applications for the Quantum Genesis Q Competition are due.

    Until then, we do not know who will enter.

    We do know considerably more about the track on which they will run.

    The federal government helped finance portions of the underlying science.

    Its laboratories helped test the machines.

    Its agencies are supporting manufacturing.

    Its researchers developed benchmarks.

    Its scientists are building verification tools.

    And now DOE has attached money to the finish line.

    For a technology famous for existing in multiple states at once, Quantum Genesis has reached at least one surprisingly definite condition.

    The government is no longer merely asking whether useful fault-tolerant quantum computing is possible.

    It is preparing to measure it.

  • Meet the Quantum Runners Washington Already Knows Quite Well

    The Quantum Genesis Files, Part Three

    This article follows Part Two of The Quantum Genesis Files.

    DOE has opened a new race toward fault-tolerant quantum computing. Many of the companies capable of running it have already spent years inside federal research, testing and validation programs.

    The Department of Energy’s Quantum Genesis Q Competition has not yet told us who will compete for its planned $215 million.

    Applications do not close until October 19.

    But Washington does not need introductions to many of the companies developing the kinds of machines DOE wants.

    IBM quantum computers have been used by researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

    So have machines from Quantinuum, IonQ and Rigetti.

    DARPA is separately scrutinizing proposed fault-tolerant systems from IBM, IonQ, Quantinuum, Atom Computing and QuEra.

    Microsoft and PsiQuantum have advanced even further into a government verification program.

    Several companies have participated in Department of Energy research centers or collaborated with DOE laboratories.

    And some received major Commerce Department quantum awards only days before DOE announced Quantum Genesis.

    This does not tell us who will apply.

    It tells us something else.

    The federal government has already spent years getting to know much of the field.

    IBM

    Start with perhaps the most familiar name.

    IBM’s approach uses superconducting quantum processors, an architecture DARPA describes more specifically as modular superconducting processors.

    IBM is currently in Stage B of DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, where the company must develop detailed research and development plans, identify technological risks and propose prototypes capable of reducing those risks.

    That is hardly IBM’s first federal quantum relationship.

    DOE’s Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility has provided researchers access to IBM machines through its Quantum Computing User Program.

    The relationship dates back years.

    DOE documented an Oak Ridge Quantum Computing Testbed Pathfinder project beginning in 2017 that partnered with IBM and IonQ while developing methods for evaluating quantum processors. The project carried funding of approximately $1.55 million per year for five years.

    IBM also participated in multiple DOE National Quantum Information Science Research Centers established in 2020.

    The relationship has therefore included research, hardware access, benchmarking and participation in DOE’s national quantum-center network.

    Then there is manufacturing.

    On September 16, the Department of Commerce finalized an award of up to $1 billion to Anderon, a newly created IBM subsidiary, for a quantum semiconductor foundry.

    One day later, DOE announced Quantum Genesis.

    None of this establishes that IBM will apply for Quantum Genesis.

    It does establish that if IBM does appear at DOE’s starting line, the company will hardly be a stranger to the federal government.

    Quantinuum

    Quantinuum presents an even denser relationship map.

    The company develops trapped-ion quantum computers using what DARPA describes as a quantum charge-coupled device architecture.

    It is also in DARPA’s Stage B.

    Oak Ridge currently purchases access to Quantinuum systems for scientists participating in its Quantum Computing User Program.

    At ORNL’s 2026 Quantum Computing User Forum, Quantinuum joined IBM, IonQ and IQM in providing workshops and presentations directly to researchers.

    The company’s federal connections extend beyond DOE.

    On September 8, the Commerce Department finalized an award of up to $100 million to address manufacturing bottlenecks involved in scaling fault-tolerant trapped-ion computers.

    The work includes integrated photonics, specialized semiconductor components and optical technologies.

    Sandia National Laboratories also announced a collaboration with Quantinuum in August to evaluate quantum technologies, including the company’s Helios system.

    Put together, the federal relationship covers access, evaluation, manufacturing research, laboratory collaboration and DARPA scrutiny of the company’s pathway toward a useful fault-tolerant computer.

    That is a considerable amount of government familiarity with one architecture.

    IonQ

    IonQ gives us another trapped-ion runner, but one following its own technological path.

    The company has longstanding connections to Oak Ridge.

    DOE’s earlier Quantum Computing Testbed Pathfinder listed IonQ alongside IBM as a project partner.

    IonQ was later added to Oak Ridge’s Quantum Computing User Program, and DOE researchers today can request access to IonQ hardware through the program.

    IonQ has also reached Stage B of DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative.

    There is another connection through the broader DOE research-center ecosystem.

    Christopher Monroe, one of IonQ’s founders, has served as a research lead within the DOE-funded Quantum Systems Accelerator.

    That center is led by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory with Sandia National Laboratories as its lead partner. Its mission includes developing scalable quantum systems, benchmarks and error-corrected technologies.

    The relationship is disclosed and consistent with the explicit purpose of DOE’s quantum centers, which were created to connect national laboratories, universities and private industry.

    But it illustrates why mapping this ecosystem is more informative than simply listing government awards.

    Money is only one kind of federal exposure.

    Researchers, laboratories, hardware, intellectual property, benchmarking and scientific collaborations form another.

    Microsoft and PsiQuantum

    Microsoft and PsiQuantum occupy an unusual position because DARPA has already moved them beyond the stage reached by most of the companies in its current benchmarking initiative.

    Both came through DARPA’s Underexplored Systems for Utility-Scale Quantum Computing program, the pilot effort later expanded into the Quantum Benchmarking Initiative.

    In February 2025, DARPA selected Microsoft and PsiQuantum for its Validation and Co-Design stage.

    That stage has the same technical objectives as Stage C of the larger initiative.

    This is where government verification becomes particularly serious.

    DARPA’s independent team evaluates whether the proposed system can actually be constructed as designed and operated as intended.

    Microsoft is pursuing a topological approach to quantum computing.

    It also has longstanding DOE relationships, including participation in the Oak Ridge-led Quantum Science Center and previous quantum research collaborations with national laboratories.

    PsiQuantum is taking a dramatically different route.

    Its architecture uses photons.

    Commerce finalized an award of up to $100 million for PsiQuantum on September 8, targeting photonic materials, single-photon detectors and ultra-low-loss packaging.

    PsiQuantum therefore sits in an interesting federal position.

    DARPA is examining whether its architecture can become an industrially useful computer.

    Commerce is helping address manufacturing problems associated with that architecture.

    DOE is now offering performance incentives for fault-tolerant quantum computers.

    Again, those are separate programs.

    Together, they reveal how many different federal doors a single quantum technology can pass through.

    Atom Computing and QuEra

    The neutral-atom branch gives the government’s portfolio yet another architecture.

    Atom Computing and QuEra are both in DARPA Stage B.

    Instead of superconducting circuits or trapped ions, these companies use arrays of neutral atoms as qubits.

    That distinction matters because nobody yet knows which architecture, if any, will ultimately prove easiest to scale into a useful fault-tolerant computer.

    DARPA explicitly acknowledges the problem.

    Unlike classical computing, quantum computing has no single dominant architecture.

    Its Stage B cohort therefore spans neutral atoms, trapped ions, superconducting systems, silicon spin qubits and photonic technologies.

    The government is not comparing slightly different versions of the same computer.

    It is evaluating fundamentally different ways of building one.

    Rigetti

    Rigetti provides an example of how the federal roster changes as technology develops.

    The company builds superconducting quantum computers.

    Oak Ridge previously contracted for access to Rigetti processors through its Quantum Computing User Program. DOE researchers used Rigetti hardware alongside IBM systems for early benchmarking and scientific experiments.

    Rigetti also entered Stage A of DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative.

    It does not appear on DARPA’s currently published Stage B list.

    That distinction is worth preserving.

    Federal participation is not a permanent stamp of technological approval. Programs change, contracts change, vendors advance at different speeds and government evaluators can reach different conclusions.

    At the same time, Commerce has made a new investment.

    Its quantum initiative identified up to $100 million for Rigetti to address scaling problems in superconducting systems, including readout electronics and next-generation cryogenic architectures.

    The federal relationship therefore continues even as its form changes.

    Google and the Rest of the Field

    Google Quantum AI entered DARPA Stage A in September 2025 with its superconducting transmon architecture.

    Google has also participated in the DOE-funded Quantum Systems Accelerator’s industry ecosystem alongside IBM and Microsoft.

    But Google illustrates another reason this series should resist turning the federal quantum landscape into a simple leaderboard.

    Different companies appear in different programs for different reasons.

    DARPA is looking for credible paths toward utility-scale quantum computers.

    DOE research centers pursue basic and applied science.

    Oak Ridge purchases commercial access for scientific users.

    Commerce is attacking manufacturing bottlenecks.

    Quantum Genesis is establishing milestones for scientifically relevant fault-tolerant systems.

    Participation in one does not guarantee participation in another.

    Absence from one does not necessarily mean a company is technologically irrelevant.

    Oak Ridge Has Been Taking Notes

    Perhaps the most revealing institution in this entire network is not a company.

    It is Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

    Its Quantum Computing User Program began in 2017.

    The program has purchased commercial quantum-computing subscriptions rather than forcing researchers to rely upon vendor demonstrations.

    Scientists can run workloads on different architectures.

    They can compare results.

    They can study error behavior.

    They can determine which machines are useful for which scientific problems.

    In 2023, Oak Ridge researchers reported what the laboratory described as the first independent comparison of leading quantum computers.

    They examined 24 processors and compared their results against performance figures promoted by vendors including IBM, Rigetti and Quantinuum.

    That is important history for Quantum Genesis.

    DOE is not suddenly confronting a collection of mysterious machines whose manufacturers must be taken at their word.

    Parts of the Department have spent years learning how to test them.

    Oak Ridge’s current program gives users access to IBM, IQM, IonQ and Quantinuum resources. The laboratory says it has purchased subscriptions to those vendor services and manages access for approved scientific projects.

    Its annual user forums bring researchers and vendors together directly.

    The 2026 forum included workshops from IBM, Quantinuum, IonQ and IQM.

    DOE is therefore simultaneously a research sponsor, customer, scientific user and evaluator within portions of the commercial quantum market.

    That arrangement is not hidden.

    It is the program.

    Nobody Has Won Yet

    After mapping these relationships, one conclusion becomes difficult to avoid.

    Washington has built a portfolio rather than placed a single bet.

    Superconducting processors remain in the mix.

    So do trapped ions.

    Neutral atoms remain in the mix.

    Photonics remains in the mix.

    Silicon and other spin-based approaches remain under examination.

    Microsoft is trying something considerably different with topological qubits.

    Some companies have received direct federal awards.

    Some provide hardware access to government scientists.

    Some participate in federally funded research centers.

    Some undergo DARPA verification.

    Several occupy multiple categories simultaneously.

    None of that establishes who will win DOE’s Quantum Genesis competition.

    It does show that when applications arrive on October 19, federal evaluators may recognize quite a few names.

    The government helped fund portions of the underlying science.

    Its laboratories worked with commercial hardware.

    Its researchers developed benchmarks.

    DARPA began examining whether company roadmaps could survive technical scrutiny.

    Commerce started financing manufacturing bottlenecks.

    DOE is now constructing another validation system and offering financial rewards for demonstrated fault-tolerant performance.

    The runners have been assembling for years.

    So have the referees.

    Sources: DARPA Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, Stage B selections; DARPA, Microsoft and PsiQuantum selected for Validation and Co-Design stage (February 2025); Commerce, Quantinuum CHIPS R&D award (September 8, 2026); Commerce, PsiQuantum CHIPS R&D award (September 8, 2026).

    That leaves one final piece of the system to examine.

    Who determines that a quantum computer has actually crossed the finish line?

    Part Four of The Quantum Genesis Files will follow the benchmarks, laboratories and federal verification programs responsible for answering that deceptively difficult question.

  • Before DOE’s $215 Million Quantum Race, Washington Had Already Spent Years Building the Track

    The Quantum Genesis Files, Part Two

    DOE’s new quantum competition carries a $215 million headline. Follow the federal money backward, however, and the starting line begins to look considerably more expensive.

    The Department of Energy’s new Quantum Genesis Q Competition offers private companies the chance to compete for as much as $215 million by demonstrating increasingly capable fault-tolerant quantum computers.

    That sounds like a large federal bet on an emerging technology.

    It is.

    It is also nowhere near the beginning of the betting.

    As Part One of The Quantum Genesis Files established, DOE spent more than a decade developing the research, benchmarks and scientific objectives behind the competition. Following the money reveals a parallel story.

    Before Washington opened a $215 million race to build a scientifically useful fault-tolerant quantum computer, it spent years financing the research centers, laboratories, industrial partnerships and manufacturing capabilities surrounding the companies now developing those machines.

    And September has been particularly busy.

    Nine days before DOE announced Quantum Genesis Q, the Department of Commerce finalized several major quantum-computing research awards.

    One day before DOE’s announcement, Commerce finalized another worth as much as $1 billion.

    The starting gun may have fired on September 17.

    A substantial amount of public money was already on the track.

    Start With $1.25 Billion

    The easiest place to begin is inside DOE itself.

    In 2020, the Department committed up to $625 million over five years to establish five National Quantum Information Science Research Centers.

    The centers were placed at Argonne, Brookhaven, Fermilab, Lawrence Berkeley and Oak Ridge national laboratories.

    They were not government laboratories working alone.

    DOE assembled multidisciplinary partnerships involving universities and private companies. When the centers were announced, the Department said its $625 million commitment was accompanied by another $340 million in contributions from private-sector and academic participants.

    The centers pursued quantum computing, networking, sensing, materials and other technologies necessary to move quantum information science toward practical applications.

    Five years later, DOE decided the experiment should continue.

    In November 2025, the Department announced another $625 million for the five centers over the next five years.

    That gives the two generations of the program a maximum announced federal value of $1.25 billion.

    That number requires an important qualification.

    It does not mean DOE deposited $1.25 billion into five laboratory bank accounts.

    The original program was funded over multiple years and subject to appropriations. For the current renewal, DOE identified $125 million in fiscal year 2025 funding and explicitly said later funding remains contingent upon congressional appropriations.

    Still, $1.25 billion represents the scale of DOE’s announced commitment to the center program across its first two generations.

    More important for Quantum Genesis is what the centers have been asked to accomplish.

    DOE says the renewed centers will work on error correction, quantum networking, modular computing, algorithms, quantum-classical workflows and other problems standing between today’s machines and useful quantum computers.

    Those are remarkably familiar problems.

    They are also among the problems companies entering Quantum Genesis must overcome.

    Then Commerce Arrived With a Checkbook

    DOE is not the only department financing the quantum ecosystem.

    On September 8, the Department of Commerce finalized a collection of CHIPS research and development awards aimed at quantum technology.

    Quantinuum received an award of up to $100 million.

    The work addresses manufacturing bottlenecks involved in scaling fault-tolerant trapped-ion quantum computers, including integrated photonics, cryogenic semiconductor controls and optical components.

    That description is worth lingering over.

    Nine days later, DOE announced a competition intended to accelerate fault-tolerant quantum computers.

    Commerce is helping finance some of the manufacturing technology necessary to build them.

    Quantinuum was not alone.

    PsiQuantum received up to $100 million for research addressing photonic quantum-computing challenges and semiconductor manufacturing.

    Commerce also finalized awards of up to $100 million each for Rigetti and D-Wave.

    GlobalFoundries received an award of up to $375 million to establish domestic manufacturing capabilities supporting quantum technologies.

    Then came September 16.

    Commerce finalized an R&D award of up to $1 billion for Anderon, a newly formed IBM subsidiary.

    The purpose is to establish a new quantum semiconductor foundry.

    The next day, DOE announced Quantum Genesis Q.

    The chronology is striking, although chronology by itself does not establish that the awards and DOE competition were coordinated.

    The programs also do different things.

    Commerce is addressing semiconductor manufacturing, supply chains and industrial-scale technological bottlenecks. DOE’s competition is trying to demonstrate scientifically relevant fault-tolerant quantum computing.

    But those objectives occupy different floors of the same building.

    One agency is helping develop the manufacturing base.

    Another is offering milestone money for machines built from the resulting technological ecosystem.

    The Government Is Funding More Than One Horse

    There is another reason not to treat these programs as interchangeable.

    Washington has not selected a single quantum-computing architecture and poured everything into it.

    Quite the opposite.

    Quantinuum develops trapped-ion systems.

    PsiQuantum is pursuing photonic quantum computing.

    IBM and Rigetti develop superconducting approaches.

    IonQ works with trapped ions.

    Atom Computing and QuEra pursue neutral atoms.

    Microsoft has pursued a topological approach.

    The federal government has maintained relationships with companies working across these competing technologies.

    DARPA provides perhaps the clearest illustration.

    Its Quantum Benchmarking Initiative is evaluating whether proposed quantum architectures can eventually reach what DARPA calls utility-scale operation, meaning their computational value exceeds their cost.

    The companies that have reached Stage B include IBM, IonQ, Quantinuum, Atom Computing and QuEra, along with several other developers using superconducting, ion, neutral-atom, silicon and photonic approaches.

    Microsoft and PsiQuantum have progressed even further through the predecessor program that became part of the initiative.

    This is not simply government subsidy.

    It is also government due diligence.

    DARPA is attempting to determine which proposed architectures can actually scale.

    DOE is now constructing a separate validation and verification system around Quantum Genesis.

    The government, in other words, is simultaneously helping develop quantum technology and building mechanisms to determine whether that technology performs as advertised.

    The Accounting Gets Messy Quickly

    This is where the temptation to produce one enormous federal quantum spending number should be resisted.

    DOE’s research centers are not the same thing as Commerce’s manufacturing awards.

    DARPA verification programs are not the same thing as DOE laboratory research.

    Private cost sharing is not federal spending.

    An award of “up to” $100 million is not necessarily $100 million already disbursed.

    Planned outyear funding dependent upon future appropriations is not money already spent.

    And Quantum Genesis itself illustrates the problem.

    DOE advertises as much as $215 million for the Q Competition, but only $2.5 million is identified as fiscal year 2026 funding. Most of the advertised amount depends upon future appropriations.

    The separate validation and verification laboratory program carries another planned $45 million, with $14 million identified for fiscal year 2026 and the remainder likewise dependent upon future funding.

    Adding every announced maximum into a single total would produce a dramatic number.

    It would also produce bad accounting.

    The more useful conclusion is that federal support for quantum computing operates through overlapping layers.

    Basic research.

    National laboratories.

    University partnerships.

    Industry research centers.

    Hardware access.

    Benchmark development.

    Prototype testing.

    Manufacturing research.

    Semiconductor supply chains.

    Independent verification.

    And now direct performance incentives.

    Quantum Genesis sits on top of those layers rather than replacing them.

    A Billion-Dollar Annual Research Enterprise

    The broader federal numbers reinforce that point.

    Quantum information science is no longer an obscure research line buried inside one agency’s science budget.

    Federal QIS research and development spending grew dramatically after passage of the National Quantum Initiative Act in 2018, involving DOE, the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Department of Defense, NASA and other agencies.

    By the middle of this decade, annual federal QIS research spending was operating around the billion-dollar scale.

    That money covers far more than quantum computers. Quantum communications, sensing, networking, materials and basic science are also part of the federal QIS portfolio.

    But it establishes the financial environment in which the current quantum-computing race developed.

    The companies competing to produce useful machines are not emerging into an untouched marketplace.

    Many have spent years working with federal laboratories, participating in federally funded research centers, supplying hardware access, joining government benchmarking programs or receiving other federal research support.

    Some now have substantial manufacturing awards as well.

    That does not mean Washington has secretly chosen a winner.

    The evidence currently suggests almost the opposite.

    The federal government appears to have deliberately maintained exposure to several competing architectures while attempting to build the scientific expertise necessary to determine which ones succeed.

    It is less a single wager than a portfolio.

    From Funding Science to Buying Results

    That distinction helps explain why Quantum Genesis represents a meaningful transition.

    Much of the government’s earlier quantum spending supported research.

    The new competition attaches substantial financial incentives to measurable performance.

    DOE wants logical qubits.

    It wants fault-tolerant operations.

    It wants scientific demonstrations.

    And it wants independent verification that those milestones have actually been reached.

    The federal government therefore appears to be moving from helping create a quantum-computing ecosystem toward asking that ecosystem to deliver a machine.

    That makes the $215 million competition less interesting as an isolated spending announcement and more interesting as a potential harvest point.

    Washington has financed research centers.

    It has supported laboratory partnerships.

    It has purchased access to commercial quantum systems.

    It has funded benchmarking.

    It is investing in domestic quantum manufacturing.

    It is building verification infrastructure.

    Now it wants results.

    The next question is who arrives at that starting line.

    Because once the federal funding programs are mapped onto the companies themselves, a surprisingly dense network emerges.

    Some prospective competitors have worked with DOE laboratories for years.

    Some participate in DOE research centers.

    Some are undergoing DARPA validation.

    Some have just received major Commerce awards.

    Some check several of those boxes at once.

    Part Three of The Quantum Genesis Files will map those companies individually and examine how much of the federal quantum ecosystem already sits behind the runners in DOE’s new race.

    Sources: DOE, $625 million for National Quantum Information Science Research Centers (2020); DOE, $625 million renewal for quantum centers (November 2025); DARPA Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, Stage B selections; Commerce, Anderon (IBM subsidiary) CHIPS R&D award up to $1 billion (September 16, 2026).

  • Deja Vu on the Clinch River: TVA’s New Nuclear Bet Looks a Lot Like Its Last One

    The Success Story With an Asterisk

    Two articles into this series (introduced in Meet the Fourth Branch)—one on the RFC and one on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—both anchored on entities that blew up spectacularly, it seemed only fair to promise readers one that actually worked.

    The Tennessee Valley Authority was supposed to be that entity: a New Deal creation from May 18, 1933, still delivering power to more than nine million people across seven states, still self-financing off electricity sales rather than congressional appropriations, still standing while the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the RFC’s mortgage-guaranteeing offspring both required federal intervention to survive their own ambitions.

    Here is the asterisk. TVA’s own regulator has spent the better part of four decades documenting a debt history that looks less like a success story and more like a rehearsal for one, and TVA is currently in the middle of placing the exact same kind of bet that got it into trouble the first time, on the exact same patch of land.

    Forty Times the Original Debt Ceiling

    TVA’s early financing was almost absurdly generous by modern standards. Congress appropriated roughly a billion dollars to the agency between 1933 and 1959, charged no interest on any of it, and ultimately treated more than a fifth of that money, 258.3 million dollars, as a straightforward taxpayer equity contribution that was never expected to be repaid at all, according to a Heritage Foundation institutional history of the agency. In 1959, Congress restructured TVA to finance itself through power revenues and its own bond issuance rather than direct appropriations, and set a statutory debt ceiling to keep the new arrangement disciplined.

    That ceiling did not hold the line for long. By 1979 Congress had raised it to 30 billion dollars, forty times the amount originally authorized twenty years earlier, driven almost entirely by TVA’s nuclear construction program. TVA started seventeen nuclear generating units during the 1960s and 1970s and completed only seven of them, according to GAO’s own account of the agency’s finances, a failure rate that turned billions of dollars of half built reactors into pure liability with no offsetting electricity to sell. By 1995, GAO reported that TVA carried 26 billion dollars in debt, with 14 billion dollars of that sunk into nonproducing nuclear assets that were not even included in the rates TVA charged customers, and warned in plain language that if TVA could not compete effectively as electricity markets opened up, the federal government might end up covering TVA’s debt itself.

    The debt problem eventually stabilized. The pension problem did not. By fiscal year 2016, GAO found TVA’s pension plan was only 54 percent funded, with unfunded liabilities that had grown steadily for a decade, and TVA had not even been reporting the shortfall in its own required performance plans. It got worse before it got better: TVA’s own numbers, reported by the Chattanooga Times Free Press, showed the plan falling to roughly 60 percent funded in 2019 and the underfunding widening to 5.6 billion dollars in 2020, driven largely by falling interest rate assumptions rather than any single management failure. Since then the pension picture has improved materially: according to the White House FY2026 Budget Appendix, as of September 30, 2024, the TVA Retirement System reported an estimated seventy-nine percent funding ratio and an unfunded liability of roughly 2.3 billion dollars—better than a decade ago, though still a meaningful gap on TVA’s balance sheet.

    Same River, New Reactor

    Here is where the story loops back on itself in a way that would be hard to invent. One of the reactors TVA never finished during its 1970s nuclear buildout was the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, a federally funded prototype fast breeder sited on TVA owned land near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, with TVA slated to buy its output. Congress killed the project in October 1983 after roughly 1.7 billion dollars had already been spent, amid years of cost estimates that kept sliding further out of reach no matter when anyone checked them.

    In May 2025, TVA became the first utility in the country to submit a construction permit application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a new small modular reactor, specifically the BWRX-300, a boiling water small modular reactor design developed by GE Vernova and Hitachi.

    The site TVA chose is Clinch River, the same 1,200 acre property where the federal government’s last big nuclear swing already failed once. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the project on April 6, 2026, per the Federal Register notice, and its Final Safety Evaluation Report on June 25, 2026, finding no safety bars to issuing the construction permit, and has targeted a permit decision for the fall of 2026, meaning a yes or no could arrive shortly before or after this article appears.

    The Department of Energy has since selected TVA for up to 800 million dollars in cost shared federal funding to advance the project, on top of a separate 400 million dollar DOE grant announced in December 2025; TVA’s board has also approved up to 350 million dollars to explore small modular reactor development at Clinch River, according to the White House FY2027 Budget Appendix. TVA has additionally signed on for a 6 gigawatt small modular reactor deployment program with a private developer, framed by the current administration as central to an American nuclear renaissance and an energy dominance agenda.

    None of this is happening because nuclear has been quietly carrying TVA’s business. Local reporting in late 2025 found TVA’s nuclear generation had actually hit its lowest level since 2007 over the preceding year, even as the agency signed on for what would be the largest small modular reactor deployment commitment in the country.

    The bet is being placed on projected future demand, principally from data centers and population growth, using the identical playbook of federally backed capital investment that produced a 26 billion dollar debt pile and a decade of underfunded pensions the last time TVA tried it.

    For some background, the TVA’s total long-term debt stood at approximately twenty-three billion dollars as of June 30, 2026, according to its most recent quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, down from the mid-1990s peak but still a substantial balance sheet obligation.

    Betting the Rate Base Again

    None of this means TVA is destined to repeat the Clinch River Breeder Reactor’s fate specifically. Small modular reactor technology is a genuinely different bet than a 1970s liquid metal fast breeder, and federal cost sharing this time is explicit up front rather than discovered after the fact.

    But the structural pattern this series keeps returning to is exactly present here, where a government corporation with an implicit federal backstop and a statutory debt ceiling that Congress has shown a consistent willingness to raise whenever the number gets inconvenient, making a decades long capital commitment to a nuclear technology that has never been built at commercial scale in the United States, funded partly by federal grants that do not show up as taxpayer risk until something goes wrong.

    TVA is not the RFC and it is not Fannie Mae. It has never needed a conservatorship or a liquidation act. But the entity billed in this series as the exception that proves government corporations can work has, on its own regulator’s paper trail, already run the exact experiment it is running again, on the same riverbank, with the same optimism about demand that never quite materialized the last time.

    Whether TVA gets to keep its status as this series’ good example may depend less on nuclear physics than on whether Congress and TVA’s own management have actually learned anything from the debt ceiling they raised forty times to pay for the last round of reactors that never got built.

    Sources: GAO, Shedding Light on Tennessee Valley Authority Debt (2017); GAO, Tennessee Valley Authority: Financial Problems Highlight Need for Long-Term Solutions (AIMD/RCED-95-134, 1995); NRC Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Clinch River SMR (Federal Register, April 6, 2026); DOE, TVA selected for up to $800 million SMR cost-sharing; TVA SEC quarterly filing (Q3 FY2026).

    Next in the series: the FDIC, the other entity in the running for the series’ success story, and what the 2023 collapse of Silicon Valley Bank revealed about how much daylight there really is between “well run” and “the last one standing.”