Category: Government Transparency

  • DOJ Rewrites the Rules on Whistleblower Suits, Right After Quietly Killing Four Times as Many of Them

    The Justice Department announced on September 18 that it was revising two sections of the Justice Manual governing the False Claims Act, the statute the government has used since 1986 to recover more than $85 billion from contractors, hospitals, and grant recipients who lied to Uncle Sam. Associate Attorney General Stanley E. Woodward Jr. described the changes in suitably poetic terms: “The Department of Justice should enforce the law, not make law through enforcement.”

    A fine sentiment, and one that would carry more weight if the policy in question were not primarily a formal blessing for something DOJ was already doing at quadruple its previous rate.

    This is not the Department’s first pass at the Manual, and it won’t be the last; the document is a living internal rulebook, revised whenever an administration wants to signal, in writing, how it intends to point the FCA’s considerable weaponry.

    What makes this revision worth a second look is not its stated content but its timing, arriving four and a half months after a senator started asking pointed, on-the-record questions about exactly the authority the Manual now blesses.

    The Manual Gets a Rewrite

    The first revision reinstates the 2017 “Brand Memo” doctrine, which holds that sub-regulatory guidance (the informal circulars, bulletins, and advisory letters agencies issue between actual rulemakings) cannot create legal obligations that don’t already exist in statute or regulation.

    This is presented as a fair notice measure, to wit, a company should be liable for breaking the law, not for failing to intuit an agency’s unpublished preferences. Reasonable enough, and DOJ is right that guidance documents have a way of acquiring the force of law without ever going through the trouble of becoming law.

    The second revision is the one that matters. It directs DOJ attorneys to affirmatively consider seeking dismissal of qui tam suits (the whistleblower-initiated cases that make up the bulk of FCA litigation) whenever the Department declines to intervene, and to keep revisiting that option as the case proceeds. This authority comes from 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), and the Supreme Court blessed its broad use in the 2023 case United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources.

    Assistant Attorney General Brett Shumate framed the update as keeping “enforcement efforts remain aligned with those interests” of the United States, which is bureaucratic for “we intend to throw more of these cases out.”

    The Numbers DOJ Would Rather You Learned From a Senator

    Here is what the press release does not mention. Senator Chuck Grassley, the Iowa Republican who wrote the 1986 amendments strengthening the FCA in the first place, sent a letter to Shumate on April 2 asking pointed questions about dismissal practices. In it, Grassley noted that DOJ dismissed roughly 25 qui tam cases under § 3730(c)(2)(A) in 2025, compared to an average of about six per year under the prior administration.

    That’s not a policy adjustment; that’s a quadrupling, delivered months before the Manual itself caught up to reflect it. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brenna Jenny made the posture explicit at an industry conference in January, telling a room full of FCA defense lawyers that “(c)(2)(A) is back.”

    None of this is happening in a vacuum of litigation. FY2025 was a record year for whistleblowers by every measure that counts, with 1,297 new qui tam suits filed, up from 980 the year before and 712 the year before that, nearly doubling in two years. Those suits generated $5.3 billion of the $6.8 billion the government recovered under the FCA in FY2025, or roughly 78 percent of the total, a figure DOJ’s own Civil Division touted as a historic high the same month Grassley was asking why the Department was dismissing whistleblower cases at four times the prior rate.

    The Department is, in other words, simultaneously bragging about relators bringing in most of its money and building the institutional machinery to throw more of their cases out. Both statements can be true. Neither makes the other look good.

    It’s worth noting where that money actually comes from. Health care accounted for roughly 84 percent of FY2025 recoveries, north of $5.7 billion, which means the cases most exposed to a more dismissal-friendly Department are precisely the ones involving hospital systems, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and Medicare and Medicaid billing practices, the same institutions that tend to have the resources to make a dismissal motion attractive to a Department weighing its limited litigation bandwidth against a case’s “alignment with the interests of the United States.”

    The Article II Question Nobody in the Press Release Mentions

    There’s a reason DOJ might want its dismissal muscle memory in good working order right now, and it has nothing to do with fair notice. The qui tam mechanism itself is under constitutional siege. In Polansky, three Supreme Court justices (Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) suggested in a concurrence and dissent that there are “substantial arguments” the entire relator-driven structure violates Article II, on the theory that private citizens cannot represent the interests of the United States in litigation the Executive Branch hasn’t chosen to bring.

    A Florida federal district court subsequently agreed and held the qui tam provisions unconstitutional outright; that ruling is now sitting with the Eleventh Circuit.

    A more aggressive dismissal posture is one of the cleanest ways for DOJ to reassert that it, not some private relator’s contingency-fee attorney, controls whether a False Claims Act case lives or dies, regardless of how the Eleventh Circuit eventually rules on the underlying constitutional question.

    Revising the Justice Manual to formalize that posture, quietly, four months after a sitting senator started asking uncomfortable questions about it, reads less like a course correction and more like an agency building the paper trail to justify a practice it had already adopted.

    What We’re Requesting

    Grassley’s 25-dismissals figure and DOJ’s own “six per year” baseline both trace back to the same letter and the same set of conference remarks. Neither is an independently verifiable dataset, and DOJ has not published a public accounting of which qui tam cases it moved to dismiss in 2025, on what grounds, or with what success rate in front of the actual district courts hearing them.

    Bureaucracy Times is filing a Freedom of Information Act request with the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch for the underlying dismissal log, including case names, filing dates, the grounds cited under § 3730(c)(2)(A), and the disposition of each motion. If DOJ’s new posture really is about “fair and effective enforcement,” as Associate Deputy Attorney General Paul Perkins put it, the underlying record should hold up to daylight.

    We’ll report back on what, if anything, we get.

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  • Federal Register Watch: October 7, 2026

    Wednesday’s Federal Register, Volume 91, Number 193, ran 148 numbered pages, and the headline rules were mostly absent. What the issue offered instead was a cluster of privacy notices in which three federal agencies described, in their own words, new or enlarged piles of personal data. The Treasury Department is assembling a file on student borrowers, the Justice Department is building a firearms rights database and asking to keep it largely closed to the people in it, and the Drug Enforcement Administration is widening who counts as a subject of its aviation records. The Labor Department, meanwhile, abandoned a rulemaking it spent fifteen months not finishing.

    Treasury Takes the Student Loan File

    The most consequential item is easy to miss because it carries a dull name. Treasury’s notice of a new system of records, Department of the Treasury .033, covers Federal Student Aid portfolio research, analysis, oversight, reporting and compliance records. Under an interagency agreement, the Education Department will hand Treasury data, including personally identifiable information, on recipients of federal student grants and loans under Title IV of the Higher Education Act. The notice names three Education sources, the National Student Loan Data System, the Default Management Collection System and the Enterprise Data Management and Analytics Platform Services, and it concedes that some of the data may come from education records protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The Office of the Fiscal Assistant Secretary and the Office of Economic Policy will run it.

    The categories of records are broad. Treasury lists loan origination, disbursement, repayment, default, collection, discharge and consolidation data, plus application and eligibility information such as dependency, income and household details. The people covered include borrowers, co-signers, endorsers, parents and spouses, along with anyone who files an inquiry or complaint. Treasury says it will use the material for research, modeling, forecasting, audit coordination and responses to oversight bodies, and it promises role based access controls, audit logging and periodic access reviews. Education remains the custodian of the underlying program records, but Treasury wants its own single system anyway, because the records serve one Treasury mission under one governance framework.

    One purpose deserves a second look. The tenth listed purpose is to support program transition, implementation, reporting and closeout activities tied to the transfer, ownership, administration, oversight or management of the portfolio. What follows is an inference and not a statement in the notice. The wording suggests Treasury expects some part of the student aid portfolio to change hands or change managers, and it is building the paper trail before the move. The reasoning rests only on that purpose line and on the notice’s repeated references to Treasury’s ownership and administration responsibilities, and the notice never says a transfer is planned. Comments are due November 6 under docket TREAS-DO-2026-0628. The notice lists no Privacy Act exemptions for the system, which makes it a useful contrast with the next item.

    A Second Chance With the Blinds Drawn

    The Office of the Pardon Attorney published two companion documents. One is a notice of a new system of records, the Firearms Rights Restoration Electronic Records Database. The other is a proposed rule exempting that database from parts of the Privacy Act. The database will receive, track and adjudicate applications under 18 U.S.C. 925(c), which lets people barred from possessing firearms ask the Attorney General for relief. The notice explains that since 1992 Congress has restricted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives from spending its appropriated funds on those investigations, which left the program unusable, and that the Attorney General withdrew ATF’s delegation in March 2025 after reviewing the matter under Executive Order 14206. A final rule on the application process followed in August 2026.

    The records will live on the FBI’s Electronic Departmental Order service inside the Next Generation Identification system, and the database will interface with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. Justice proposes to claim exemptions under subsections (j)(2) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, the law enforcement provisions, from several requirements, including the rights to request access to and amendment of one’s own records. The stated reasons are that notice, access and amendment would reveal the nature and scope of the adjudication, chill candid communication among officials advising the Attorney General, and expose people who gave information under a promise of confidentiality. Those are real interests. They are also bought with the applicant’s own access and correction rights, which is what the exemption does by its terms. Comments on both documents are due November 6.

    Down the page, the DEA republished and retitled its aviation records system as the DEA Aviation Division Reporting System, last published in full in 2000. The old notice covered pilots. The revision adds DEA employees and contractors, vendors, detainees, inmates, non-DEA law enforcement personnel and other federal employees and contractors, and it updates the record categories, purposes and routine uses. Comments are due November 5. The addition of detainees and inmates suggests the system now tracks passengers as well as crews, an inference drawn only from the expanded list of covered individuals.

    Labor Declines to Move Its Furniture

    The Wage and Hour Division withdrew a proposed rule it published on July 2, 2025, which would have removed from the Code of Federal Regulations the Fair Labor Standards Act interpretive parts that were never issued or amended through notice and comment. The idea was to demote those parts to subregulatory guidance posted elsewhere. The comment period ran 30 days. The Department received six substantive comments, two in favor and four opposed, and it denied 10 requests for more time. Fifteen months later, Administrator Andrew B. Rogers signed the withdrawal, which took effect October 6.

    The stated reason is that further action no longer aligns with the Department’s needs, priorities and objectives, a sentence that could justify almost any abandoned project. The notice adds that commenters raised concerns about the effect on specific industries and that the Department will keep looking for ways to modernize its interpretive guidance. For employers and workers who rely on those parts, the practical result is that the guidance stays exactly where it was.

    The Rest of the Docket

    The Federal Reserve extended the comment period on its Regulation O proposal by 30 days, to November 4, after commenters asked for more time. The August 4 proposal would update the rule on loans by member banks to their insiders, index outdated dollar thresholds, and address how the rule applies to banks that lend to companies presumed to be controlled by large asset managers through passive investment funds. The Copyright Office opened a notice of inquiry on music streaming fraud at the request of Representative Scott Fitzgerald of the House Judiciary Committee, with comments due November 23 and replies December 21. The notice puts domestic streaming revenue for sound recordings at about $9.5 billion.

    The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative confirmed that the two 2018 Section 301 actions on China did not terminate on their four year anniversaries, because domestic industry representatives asked that they continue, and the statutory review goes on. The Department of Energy withdrew the appendix B test procedure for commercial warm air furnaces in a final rule, finding an uncertain gain in representativeness that did not outweigh the burden. The IRS asked for comments, due December 7, on its information collection for Trump Account elections. The Office of Special Counsel published a notice naming the members of its Senior Executive Service Performance Board, and sanctions actions from the Office of Foreign Assets Control filled 17 pages. The only presidential document was Proclamation 11071, designating National Manufacturing Day.

  • Federal Register Watch: October 6, 2026

    Tuesday’s Federal Register, Volume 91, Number 192, ran 630 pages, and three documents account for 424 of them. Two are Securities and Exchange Commission proposals, one on crypto custody and one on who may charge performance fees, and the third is a 120-page final rule on health insurance price transparency. The more revealing material sits in the margins, where FinCEN retired two proposals that would have watched crypto move and the Treasury Department shielded a new fraud tip line from the Privacy Act.

    Self-Custody, Now With Paperwork

    Start with the SEC’s proposal on adviser and fund custody rules and crypto custody rules, which runs 234 pages and takes comments until December 7. The core idea is that a registered investment adviser could hold a client’s crypto itself when no permitted custodian is available, provided the adviser documents that finding in writing at the outset and again every quarter. The release adds conditions. The adviser must mitigate cybersecurity risks and review its controls at least annually, and it must obtain internal control reports within six months and yearly after that. A fund’s board would have to decide, before the adviser takes possession and annually afterward, that the asset would receive reasonable care in the adviser’s hands.

    It is a tidy structure, and the release is candid about why custody rules exist. It recounts that when the adviser and the custodian are the same party, the adviser can move the assets directly, and that a separate custodian’s account statement is what discourages unauthorized trading. The proposal then builds a path for the adviser to be both. The justification is practical and not frivolous. The SEC says custodians cannot support every token, that new assets may have no custodian at all, and that state trust companies have been unsure whether they count as banks, a problem staff addressed with a September 2025 no-action letter. The release also leans on the Crypto Task Force the commission created in January 2025 and on Executive Order 14178. A safeguard that rests on the fox’s quarterly memo about the henhouse is still a safeguard, technically. The comment file will show whether it is a good one.

    Its companion, Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, would widen who may pay advisers a share of capital gains. It would expand the arrangement for registered funds and business development companies under conditions, and it would extend the exemption to investors who meet the Regulation D accredited investor definition. Comments are also due December 7. The SEC expects the change to let a wider range of advisers offer regulated funds and to put more strategies inside them. Whether shareholders were asking for more performance fees is a question the comment file will answer.

    The Mixers Are Forgiven

    Pages 63513 to 63515 hold the day’s best contrast. FinCEN withdrew its 2023 proposal to treat international crypto mixing as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern, and it separately withdrew a 2020 proposal on transactions involving unhosted wallets. The mixing rule would have required covered financial institutions to report mixing transactions, with customer identity details attached. The wallet proposal would have required reports and identity verification above $10,000, and recordkeeping above $3,000, when a counterparty used an unhosted or otherwise covered wallet.

    The stated reasons come in two registers. On mixers, FinCEN cites commenters’ concern that the definition was broad enough to chill legitimate activity and burden institutions, and it points to a July 2025 report from the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, which said the administration supports lawful users transacting privately on public blockchains. In the same notice the agency concedes that illicit actors still use mixers to hinder investigations and says it will keep monitoring. On wallets, the explanation is that withdrawal is part of making digital asset rules fit for purpose, and FinCEN will take no further action. Deputy Director Jimmy L. Kirby signed both.

    Set that beside the SEC’s custody proposal and the day has a theme. The government is making room for crypto to be held, and moved, with fewer questions put to the people doing the moving. Each agency has reasons, and some of them are good. But the same Tuesday that loosens one reporting net shows the Treasury Department weaving another, which brings us to the third item.

    A Tip Line With a Privacy Shield

    Treasury’s final rule on Privacy Act exemptions concerns a new system of records, Treasury .032, for Federal Program Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Tip Intake and Referral Records. The system will take in tips from the public, agencies, contractors and grant recipients about suspected fraud, improper payments and misuse of federal funds, then triage them and refer them to other agencies and inspectors general. Treasury exempts the system from certain Privacy Act provisions under the law enforcement investigatory material provision, effective November 5, and cites Executive Orders 14249 and 14395 as the policy backing.

    Treasury received two comments on its June proposal. One called the exemptions overly broad and raised transparency and oversight concerns. The other supported protecting genuine investigatory material but urged Treasury to narrow the exemption and preserve protections for records that are not law enforcement related. Treasury kept the exemptions, and says they do not reach every record merely because it sits in the system. That is a fair limit on paper. In practice a tip line is where a neighbor’s grudge and a real fraud look identical at intake, which is exactly the stage at which access and correction rights matter most.

    Three other privacy filings ran the same morning, and they are mostly housekeeping. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission republished 13 systems of records notices after a comprehensive review, with four (NRC 27, 36, 39 and 40) substantively revised and comments due November 5. The National Archives is revising NARA 44, its reasonable accommodation records, to cover pregnancy and childbirth requests under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act and to move some processing into a web based application. The FDIC rescinded two applicant recruiting systems because an Office of Personnel Management government-wide notice already covers them.

    The Rest of the Docket

    The 120-page Transparency in Coverage final rule, a joint product of the IRS, the Labor Department’s benefits arm and CMS, takes effect December 7. Citing Executive Order 14221, it adds contextual files and data elements such as product type and network name to the machine-readable pricing files, changes the level at which data is aggregated, lengthens the reporting period and lowers the claims threshold for out-of-network historical data, trims reporting frequency, and requires pricing information to be available by phone.

    The FDA opened a request for information on ibogaine trial design, covering dose escalation, care setting, safety monitoring and stopping rules, and noted that HHS is funding development and that the first federally supported trials are expected to enroll adults with opioid use disorder and adults with PTSD. Comments are due November 20. The agency also issued device rules classifying a hyperoxia monitor used with pulse oximetry, a focused ultrasound system for non-thermal tissue ablation and a high throughput DNA sequencing test for hereditary cancer predisposition, plus an exemption for certain clinical toxicology test systems.

    The remainder includes NHTSA and NTIA eliminating obsolete 911 grant program regulations, a NHTSA request for information on prehospital blood transfusion, HUD‘s 2027 designation of Difficult Development Areas and Qualified Census Tracts, the SEC’s acknowledgment of ICE Futures U.S. filing Form 1-N under Section 6(g) to register as a national securities exchange, a NOAA final rule under Amendment 62 raising Gulf of America red grouper catch limits, effective October 2, an EPA Notice of Availability seeking comment on initial air quality designations under the 2024 revised annual PM2.5 standard, which tightened the annual limit to 9.0 micrograms per cubic meter and carries a 30-day public comment period, and 15 pages of OFAC sanctions actions. The issue carried no presidential documents and no executive orders.

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  • We Asked America.gov 15 Questions the Government Already Answered. It Did Surprisingly Well.

    The federal government launched a new artificial intelligence system Tuesday with an ambitious proposition: instead of making Americans figure out which agency, office, subagency, program, website, form and acronym possesses the thing they need, perhaps the government could figure that out for them.

    It is called America.gov, and on its first night in operation, Bureaucracy Times decided to give it a test.

    Not a test involving the capital of Nebraska or how to renew a passport. We gave it questions from our own reporting, including obscure federal contracts, nuclear waste, contaminated nickel, pension reporting requirements, used cooking oil, veterans benefits fraud, classified Pentagon clocks, voter records and one of the strangest securities disputes to pass through FINRA in recent years.

    The result was not what we expected.

    America.gov did remarkably well.

    Across 15 questions for which Bureaucracy Times had independently established an answer, established that no public answer exists, or possessed information unavailable to the general public, America.gov produced nine answers we classified as correct and six that were substantially correct but incomplete.

    We identified no fabricated answers.

    Not one.

    For an artificial intelligence system introduced by the federal government, an institution that has occasionally demonstrated an almost artisanal commitment to making simple information difficult to obtain, that deserves some credit.

    America.gov did have problems. It sometimes failed to retrieve information buried inside federal reports. Some of its statistics were years behind newer government figures. It occasionally found one government source while overlooking another containing the missing answer.

    And, in one particularly delightful encounter with the machinery of modern government, America.gov prevented us from asking about a federal contract because it apparently mistook the government’s own contract number for our personal information.

    Still, after an evening spent deliberately trying to make the new system stumble, the most consistent behavior we encountered was something increasingly valuable in the age of generative artificial intelligence:

    When America.gov did not know something, it generally said so.

    A New Front Door With 29,000 Rooms

    The General Services Administration unveiled America.gov on September 29 as what it calls a new digital “front door” to federal information and services.

    According to GSA’s launch announcement, America.gov combines information from more than 29,000 government websites with AI-enhanced search technology. Instead of navigating the federal government’s sprawling collection of agency websites, GSA says Americans will eventually be able to use a single interface to find information and conduct transactions.

    The White House goes further.

    Its September 29 fact sheet says Americans can currently “ask any question” and receive an up-to-date answer. Eventually, the administration says, people will be able to complete transactions including passport renewals and Medicare enrollment without being dispatched back into what the White House rather accurately calls a “maze of websites.”

    President Donald Trump also signed an executive order directing GSA, the National Design Studio and the Office of Management and Budget to establish America.gov as the central entry point for covered federal services.

    The government, in other words, has created a website designed to spare Americans from having to understand how the government created its websites.

    There is a certain elegance to that.

    There is also an immediate accountability question.

    What, exactly, are those 29,000 websites?

    GSA’s announcement does not provide the inventory or explain what it counts as a website. A domain could be a website. So could a subdomain. An agency might operate multiple applications or collections beneath one domain. And saying that America.gov “combines information” from 29,000 websites does not tell us whether every document hosted on those sites is searchable by the system.

    As our experiment would demonstrate, that distinction matters.

    Bureaucracy Times sent GSA a media inquiry Tuesday night asking for the inventory, the definition used to arrive at the 29,000 figure, the inclusion criteria, update frequency, source-ranking methodology and information about the AI models and providers operating the system.

    We also asked about records retention, system instructions, configuration changes and whether America.gov was designed and tested for research uses such as locating FOIA offices and federal records.

    The inquiry was sent at 9:50 p.m. Eastern. We will update this article if GSA responds.

    America.gov Has Been Here Before

    The name is new to many Americans. The domain is not.

    America.gov previously belonged to a State Department public-diplomacy operation intended largely for international audiences.

    A 2011 Senate Foreign Relations Committee record states that the old America.gov was transitioned to the State Department’s IIP Digital operation and archived on April 1, 2011.

    It was not an obscure little government webpage when it disappeared.

    According to the Senate record, America.gov had averaged approximately 1.67 million monthly page views and 925,288 monthly visitors, with 63.52 percent of visits coming from outside the United States.

    The federal government has therefore resurrected the address of what was once an American public-diplomacy operation and turned it into an AI gateway for Americans trying to navigate their own government.

    Washington does recycle.

    Sometimes it even recycles websites.

    Our Test Was Not Random

    We wanted to know whether America.gov could do more than tell someone where to renew a passport.

    Could a journalist use it?

    Could a researcher?

    Could an ordinary citizen trying to understand an inspector general report, federal contract or regulatory requirement use the government’s new front door to find information scattered through the federal bureaucracy?

    Rather than invent trivia questions, we selected 15 questions from Bureaucracy Times reporting and research conducted during the past month.

    That gave us something unusually useful when testing an AI system: a control.

    For some questions, we already knew the answer from federal records.

    For others, our reporting had established that the answer was not publicly available.

    In several cases, we possessed agency correspondence America.gov should not have access to at all.

    We recorded the responses and compared them against our existing reporting. Answers were classified as correct, partially correct, incorrect, unsupported or no answer. A separate category was created when America.gov’s safeguards prevented a question from being submitted.

    The final score was nine correct and six partially correct.

    There were no answers we classified as incorrect or unsupported.

    There were no hallucinations we could identify.

    That last finding deserves more attention than the score.

    When America.gov Couldn’t Find the Answer

    The system’s weaknesses appeared quickly.

    We asked how many separated Customs and Border Protection contractors retained system access after separation and how many contractor separation records were delayed more than 30 days.

    America.gov located the correct 2026 Department of Homeland Security inspector general report.

    Then it stopped.

    It said the available material did not provide the requested counts and suggested opening the full OIG report.

    The numbers are 1,208 and 623.

    America.gov had found the building but apparently couldn’t get into the room where the numbers were kept.

    A similar problem emerged when we asked how much the federal government has paid from the Judgment Fund because the Department of Energy failed to begin accepting commercial spent nuclear fuel in 1998.

    America.gov reconstructed the history accurately. It found totals of approximately $3.7 billion through fiscal 2013, $7.4 billion through fiscal 2018 and $10.1 billion as of September 30, 2022.

    It correctly distinguished those payments from DOE’s projected future liability.

    But our reporting had already located a newer figure of approximately $12.2 billion.

    America.gov’s answer was accurate as far as it went. It simply did not go far enough.

    The same happened when we asked how much commercial spent nuclear fuel is currently stored around the country. America.gov found official figures ranging from roughly 86,000 to more than 90,000 metric tons and correctly explained that there is no operating permanent federal repository.

    Newer federal information puts the inventory above 95,000 metric tons.

    Again, the problem was not fabrication.

    It was freshness.

    Then It Found the Nickel

    We turned up the difficulty.

    DOE has spent decades dealing with thousands of tons of radioactively contaminated nickel at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky.

    Bureaucracy Times had previously identified a curious discrepancy. An older DOE environmental assessment described 8,500 contaminated nickel ingots weighing approximately 9,350 short tons. Later DOE documents described approximately 9,700 tons.

    We asked America.gov for both figures.

    It found them.

    More impressively, the system corrected a chronological assumption embedded in our question rather than obediently accepting it. It explained that the earlier environmental assessment was the contemporaneous source and then located the later 9,700-ton figure.

    America.gov went one better.

    It found that DOE was still citing approximately 9,700 tons of contaminated nickel in a November 2025 Expression of Interest.

    That was a genuine research result.

    For a system less than a day old, searching through decades of obscure nuclear cleanup documents, it was impressive.

    Then we gave it a federal contract number.

    And America.gov decided we had gone too far.

    Please Remove the Government’s Personal Information

    We asked:

    How much recyclable-material credit did DOE receive under Contract DE-AC05-97OR22576 at the East Tennessee Technology Park?

    America.gov would not allow the question to be submitted.

    The contract number, DE-AC05-97OR22576, was highlighted in red.

    The interface instructed us: “Remove personal information before sending.”

    We preserved a screenshot.

    To be precise, our test establishes only that this particular public federal contract identifier triggered America.gov’s personal-information safeguard. It does not establish that all federal contract numbers will do so.

    But federal research depends heavily on identifiers. Contract numbers, solicitation numbers, docket numbers, case numbers, grant numbers, award identifiers and FOIA tracking numbers are the connective tissue of the government’s public record.

    A research system that occasionally mistakes those identifiers for private information could have a meaningful limitation.

    So we removed the contract number and tried again.

    America.gov immediately found the correct BNFL contract.

    It identified the original $238 million fixed-price agreement, approximately 129,000 tons of potentially reusable metal, $12 million in approved upward price adjustments and a roughly $40 million claim associated with DOE’s moratorium on releasing recycled nickel.

    It could not find the figure we wanted.

    Our previous research identified a recyclable-material credit of $55,569,748 in contract documentation.

    America.gov had once again arrived remarkably close to the answer without retrieving the particular fact buried in the record.

    The Questions With No Answers

    Then something interesting happened.

    America.gov began performing better when we asked questions that did not have public answers.

    We asked how much DOE has spent storing the contaminated Paducah nickel since the proposed sale failed decades ago.

    We do not know.

    America.gov did not know either.

    “I cannot invent that number,” it responded.

    That sentence may be the most important thing America.gov told us all night.

    We asked how many Form 10 attrition events involving frozen pension plans the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation receives each year.

    PBGC recently waived certain reporting requirements after saying its review showed such events rarely warranted additional scrutiny, but the agency did not publish the annual count underlying that conclusion. Bureaucracy Times sent PBGC a media inquiry seeking precisely that data earlier this month.

    America.gov found the technical update, explained the reporting requirements and correctly concluded that the annual figure could not be established from the published information.

    It did not grab some other PBGC statistic and force it into the hole.

    Then we asked whether federal renewable-fuel regulations require producers to prove that used cooking oil was lawfully obtained from the restaurant or original owner before generating Renewable Identification Numbers.

    America.gov correctly distinguished EPA’s feedstock documentation requirements from proof of lawful ownership.

    We followed with an even nastier question: Can stolen used cooking oil qualify for the Section 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit if a fuel producer unknowingly purchases it?

    Bureaucracy Times has already asked Treasury and the IRS essentially that question.

    We have not found a definitive public answer.

    Neither did America.gov.

    It explained what Section 45Z requires, identified the relevant recordkeeping requirements and then stopped.

    It did not convert the absence of a prohibition into eligibility.

    It did not convert the absence of an eligibility provision into prohibition.

    That is exactly what an information system should do.

    It Also Knew What It Shouldn’t Know

    One of our tests involved Zachary Hess Dawson, who pleaded guilty in a federal prosecution involving more than $350,000 in fraudulently obtained VA benefits.

    Bureaucracy Times previously submitted a FOIA request to the VA Office of Inspector General seeking records concerning how the alleged fraud was detected and how the benefits continued.

    VA OIG denied our request under FOIA Exemption 7(A), citing the pending criminal proceeding.

    We asked America.gov why VA OIG denied access.

    It couldn’t answer.

    That was the correct response.

    The denial letter was sent directly to us. America.gov found the prosecution and the OIG investigation, but it could not find a public agency determination explaining our particular denial.

    Rather than infer that the pending prosecution was probably the reason, America.gov said it could not state why the request was denied.

    We then asked how VA continued paying Dawson from 2017 through 2025 and whether his arrest or incarceration triggered discovery of the alleged fraud.

    Again, America.gov found the known facts and refused to construct a causal story from them.

    The public record does not answer those questions.

    Neither did the machine.

    For journalists accustomed to watching generative AI confidently connect two dots with a third dot it just invented, restraint is worth noticing.

    The Classified Clocks Exposed Another Weakness

    Not every miss involved an obscure historical document.

    Earlier this month, the Department of War inspector general released an audit concerning security controls over Defense Regional Clocks.

    All 10 recommendations are classified.

    We asked America.gov why.

    It correctly determined that the government has not publicly disclosed the underlying classification rationale. It also found the original project announcement showing that the audit began after Hotline allegations.

    But America.gov said it could not verify publicly that there were 10 recommendations.

    That information is sitting on another government website.

    Oversight.gov publicly lists the report and identifies 10 recommendations, each classified.

    Here, America.gov successfully searched one portion of the federal information ecosystem while missing another federal source containing the information it lacked.

    That is an important limitation for a service advertised as combining information from more than 29,000 government websites.

    What does “combines” mean?

    Our test suggests it does not necessarily mean that every relevant piece of information across those sites will be retrieved and synthesized for every query.

    Public Records Still Matter

    We saw the same boundary when we asked whether Virginia election officials had provided voter-list products to organizations involved in an overseas-voter mail inquiry.

    America.gov correctly explained Virginia’s restrictions on distributing voter information and said it could not verify that such a transfer occurred.

    We knew something it didn’t.

    Virginia’s Department of Elections had already responded to our records request saying it found no responsive records for the requested voter-list products involving the specified organizations.

    That isn’t a failure by America.gov.

    It is a reminder of what the system cannot replace.

    Search can tell a journalist what the government has published.

    A records request can establish what the government has not.

    America.gov may make federal research considerably easier. It does not eliminate the need to ask agencies questions they haven’t already answered on the internet.

    The bureaucracy lives to see another FOIA.

    The MMTLP Test

    Our fourteenth question concerned MMTLP, the ticker symbol at the center of a years-long dispute involving FINRA’s December 2022 trading halt.

    America.gov accurately reconstructed FINRA’s stated reason for imposing a U3 extraordinary-event halt, including the settlement problem surrounding the distribution of Next Bridge Hydrocarbons shares.

    But it failed to locate a separate systems coding error involving MMTLP that FINRA subsequently acknowledged and that Bureaucracy Times had already identified during earlier reporting.

    Again, the prominent portion of the record was easy to find.

    The less prominent official disclosure was not.

    America.gov’s source discipline nevertheless held. It encountered investor allegations concerning other supposed errors and refused to characterize those allegations as official FINRA findings.

    Another partial answer.

    Another refusal to manufacture the missing piece.

    One Last Trap

    Our final question concerned the U.S. Arctic Research Commission.

    We asked for aggregate payroll and employer-paid personnel costs processed by the Interior Business Center for fiscal years 2024 and 2025.

    We don’t have those numbers yet. They are part of an ongoing records inquiry.

    America.gov found something that looked tantalizingly close: NSF budget tables showing USARC personnel compensation and benefits.

    For fiscal 2024, it found approximately $1.008 million.

    A less careful system could have handed us that number.

    America.gov didn’t.

    It explicitly distinguished budgeted personnel compensation and benefits from actual payroll and employer-paid costs processed through IBC.

    “I cannot confirm those IBC figures from these official sources,” it said.

    Correct.

    America.gov Wins Round One

    This was not a comprehensive technical evaluation.

    Fifteen questions cannot establish the overall accuracy of an AI system drawing information from a federal web environment that GSA says encompasses more than 29,000 websites. Our questions were also deliberately unusual. They came from the kinds of federal audits, contracts, regulatory disputes and records inquiries Bureaucracy Times spends its time digging through.

    But that was the point.

    We weren’t interested in whether America.gov could tell us how to apply for Social Security.

    We wanted to know what happened when a citizen walked through the government’s shiny new front door carrying a shovel.

    The answer, after one evening of testing, is encouraging.

    America.gov was not omniscient. It missed current figures. It sometimes failed to retrieve facts from reports it had correctly identified. It failed on some cross-government searches. And its privacy safeguard apparently looked at a Department of Energy contract number and decided we were trying to disclose someone’s personal information.

    There is work to do.

    But the failure we expected to find never arrived.

    We could not get America.gov to make something up.

    Several of our hardest questions were hard precisely because the answers remain unknown. America.gov consistently recognized that distinction. It found related evidence, explained what that evidence established and stopped before turning inference into fact.

    For researchers and journalists, that characteristic may ultimately matter more than whether every answer is immediately complete.

    Completeness can be investigated.

    A confident fabrication can send the investigation in the wrong direction entirely.

    There are also larger accountability questions still unanswered. GSA says America.gov draws from more than 29,000 government websites, but we have asked for the inventory behind that claim. We want to know how sources are selected and ranked, how quickly information is updated, which AI models are involved, how configuration changes are documented and what records are preserved when the system’s behavior changes.

    Those questions became particularly relevant on launch day. The Associated Press reported that America.gov initially answered several politically sensitive questions using government information, then began refusing some of those questions while President Trump was still speaking at the launch event. That does not tell us why the behavior changed or who changed it. It does demonstrate why configuration histories and change logs for a federal information system matter.

    GSA itself maintains an agency-wide AI directive requiring risk management, transparency and lifecycle accountability for covered AI systems. America.gov is now a very public test of what those principles mean when artificial intelligence becomes an intermediary between citizens and their government.

    And this is only the beginning.

    The White House says America.gov will eventually move beyond answering questions and begin conducting government transactions. Passport renewals and Medicare enrollment are among the services promised.

    At that point, accuracy will become something more than a search-quality metric.

    For now, though, America.gov has been online for one day.

    We spent its first evening feeding it questions about radioactive nickel, stolen cooking grease, pension reporting, classified clocks, securities regulation, federal payrolls, benefits fraud and a contract number it apparently wished we had kept to ourselves.

    It survived.

    More importantly, when it didn’t know the answer, it usually had the good sense to say so.

    For the federal government’s new AI front door, that is a surprisingly good place to start.

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  • One Email Can Still Turn the National Labor Relations Board Off

    Late on January 27, 2025, a National Labor Relations Board member named Gwynne Wilcox got an email from a White House staffer telling her she was fired, effective immediately. No hearing. No stated cause. Her term ran to August 2028. The National Labor Relations Act says a Board member “may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.” None of that happened. What happened instead is that a labor enforcement apparatus covering the entire private sector stopped working, by design, because of how few people it takes to make it stop.

    The Quorum Is the Whole Point

    The NLRB has five seats, but the Act requires three members present to do anything at all, per Section 3(b), and the Supreme Court made that requirement absolute in New Process Steel v. NLRB (2010), tossing out roughly 600 decisions a two-member Board had issued over 27 months on the theory that two was close enough. It was not. So when Wilcox’s seat emptied, the Board had two members left. Below quorum, the agency cannot certify a union election, cannot rule on an unfair labor practice charge, cannot seek a 10(j) injunction against an employer firing organizers mid-campaign. It can receive filings. It cannot decide them.

    This is worth sitting with, because it means removing one person, out of five, on a board that oversees private-sector labor relations for the entire country, is functionally the same as abolishing the agency for as long as the seat stays empty. Congress built in that fragility assuming no president would exploit it. That assumption did not survive contact with 2025.

    The Ninety Year Old Fence Comes Down

    Wilcox sued. In March 2025, Judge Beryl Howell reinstated her, writing that the removal was “blatantly illegal,” leaning on Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), the case letting Congress insulate agency heads like FTC and NLRB members from at will removal for nine decades. The government appealed. In April 2025, the Supreme Court granted an emergency stay letting the firing stand, without yet deciding the underlying question, but noting the NLRB wields “considerable executive power,” a phrase that told you exactly where this was going more than a year before the Court said so on the merits.

    By December 2025, the D.C. Circuit obliged, ruling that NLRB removal protections violate Article II, consolidated with a companion case over the Merit Systems Protection Board. Then in June 2026, the Court delivered Trump v. Slaughter, tossing Humphrey’s Executor out entirely and holding that anyone who exercises executive power (adjudicating cases, writing binding rules, suing on the government’s behalf) has to be removable at the President’s will. The FTC lost its removal protections that day. The MSPB’s cert petition was denied the next. And this September, the Solicitor General filed a brief telling the Court that Wilcox’s case is moot for the same reason, since the NLRB does the identical three things (adjudicates, rules, sues) that got the FTC stripped of its tenure protections. DOJ wants cert denied outright, or granted and summarily affirmed, because there is nothing left to argue.

    The Federal Reserve Gets to Keep Its Fence

    Here is the detail that belongs in the lede of somebody’s dissertation someday. On the same day the Court decided Slaughter, a different lineup of justices decided Trump v. Cook, holding that the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors is not subject to the same logic, and its removal protections survive. Same Court, same day, same constitutional text, opposite outcome, because the majority drew a line around the one institution whose independence bond markets actually price. The NLRB, which decides whether a shop steward gets reinstated, did not make the cut. The body that sets interest rates did. If “executive power” were a neutral legal category rather than a permission slip issued selectively, you would expect it to catch both agencies or neither. It caught the one nobody holding a bond portfolio would tolerate touching.

    Every Future President Now Owns a Switch

    Strip away the doctrinal packaging and what Slaughter hands the next several administrations, of either party, is a standing option. Dislike how an independent board is ruling, and you no longer need Congress to restructure it. Fire one member below quorum and the agency goes dark until you nominate a replacement, on your own schedule. The NLRB is uniquely exposed here because its quorum floor is so low relative to its seat count, three of five, that a single vacancy (whether from resignation, expiration, or a late-night email) can freeze it entirely. The FTC carries the same removal exposure now but a sturdier quorum structure, so it does not fail as cleanly. The NLRB does.

    Wilcox’s case will likely end quietly, denied or summarily affirmed, exactly as DOJ has asked, because the fight over the underlying constitutional question is already over. What is not over is the operational fact this litigation exposed almost as an aside. An agency built to arbitrate between employers and organized labor can be switched off by any president willing to fire one person and wait. Nobody had to rewrite the National Labor Relations Act to accomplish that. They just had to win a case about somebody else’s agency.

    Sources: National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153; New Process Steel v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010); Supreme Court emergency stay order, April 9, 2025; Solicitor General brief, Wilcox v. Trump (September 2026).

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  • DOJ Warns About Ubiquitous Surveillance. We’d Tell You What Table 2 Says, But It’s Redacted

    The Justice Department has a ubiquitous technical surveillance problem.

    It does not have a department-wide definition for that problem. Until recently, it had no coordinated strategy for managing it. No individual or office had explicit responsibility for coordinating the response. And when auditors went looking for employee training specifically addressing the threat, they found none.

    Then there is Table 2.

    We would tell you what Table 2 says, but the Justice Department has blacked out essentially the entire thing.

    That would ordinarily be little more than an irritating footnote in the world of federal records. In this particular report, however, the black boxes inadvertently provide a rather good demonstration of exactly what the Inspector General is warning about.

    Bureaucracy Times received the report the decidedly unglamorous way investigative journalism occasionally happens. We entered an email address on a government website and subscribed to updates from the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General.

    No classified records request. No FOIA lawsuit. No source slipping an envelope under the door.

    We asked the government to send us its newsletter.

    And the government sent us a report containing a table it apparently could not show us.

    The digital trail everyone leaves behind

    The September 2026 report, Audit of the Department of Justice’s Efforts to Mitigate the Effects of Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance, examines what DOJ calls UTS.

    The concept is remarkably broad.

    According to the OIG, ordinary use of technology and online services creates digital trails and discoverable connections. UTS involves capturing and analyzing that information to connect people with things, events or locations. The FBI divides the threat into five vectors: visual and physical surveillance, electronic signals, financial information, travel information and online activity.

    A cellphone can reveal location information. Financial transactions contain identifiers. Hotel stays and airline reservations create records. Browsing and social-media activity generate advertising data.

    Individually, those records may appear mundane.

    Combined, they can tell a story.

    Sometimes a deadly one.

    The OIG’s previous 2025 audit of the FBI documented a drug-cartel investigation in which the cartel hired a hacker who exploited mobile phones and other electronic devices to obtain call and geolocation information. According to the Inspector General, that information was used to intimidate and, in some cases, kill potential sources or cooperating witnesses.

    In another organized-crime investigation, call logs on an employee’s cellphone exposed communications with a known FBI-issued phone. The FBI lost the source.

    These aren’t hypothetical privacy concerns dreamed up for the annual cybersecurity PowerPoint.

    People can die.

    Investigations can be compromised.

    Sources can disappear.

    And the OIG concluded that the problem extends well beyond the FBI.

    DOJ had a threat without a strategy

    Following its FBI audit, the Inspector General expanded its examination to the rest of the Justice Department.

    What it found was not reassuring.

    The auditors concluded that, outside the FBI, DOJ had not taken sufficient steps to manage the UTS threat. The deficiencies, according to the OIG, increased risks to Department employees, investigations, operations, sources and witnesses.

    DOJ didn’t even have a common department-wide definition of ubiquitous technical surveillance.

    The OIG found no individual or office explicitly responsible for coordinating DOJ’s response. There was no policy or guidance establishing how components should coordinate on UTS. And there was no single mechanism ensuring that information about emerging threats and mitigation practices moved throughout the Department.

    Of 16 DOJ components and units interviewed outside the FBI, the auditors found that only the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Defensive Counterintelligence Unit had developed its own definition of UTS.

    The DEA defined it as the widespread and continuous collection of data through technologies, often involving ordinary devices and activities, that can be connected back to an individual.

    The FBI, meanwhile, was considerably further along.

    Following the earlier OIG audit, the bureau designated UTS a “Tier 1 Enterprise Risk,” conducted an FBI-wide assessment, began developing a mitigation plan and training program, and continued working on an enterprise-wide UTS strategy.

    The rest of DOJ was playing catch-up.

    Forty-six courses. Zero dedicated to UTS.

    Perhaps the cleanest measurement of that gap appears in the Department’s training records.

    DOJ identified 46 training courses offered during fiscal years 2024 and 2025 that it believed might be related to ubiquitous technical surveillance.

    The Inspector General checked.

    None was UTS-specific.

    Some courses touched subjects related to the threat, but according to the auditors, none actually described the UTS threat, explained how it might be exploited to DOJ’s advantage or taught personnel how to protect the Department from it.

    Only seven of the 46 courses were mandatory.

    Participation in the remaining voluntary courses among non-FBI DOJ personnel was less than 1 percent.

    The mandatory offerings included general DOJ information-technology training, DEA’s Foreign Travel Briefing, ATF’s Counterintelligence Awareness and Security Training, and U.S. Marshals Service courses covering operations security.

    The OIG concluded that DOJ had neither baseline UTS awareness training for its workforce nor specialized UTS training for employees working in particularly sensitive areas such as surveillance, source handling and counterintelligence.

    There is a substantial difference between not recognizing a theoretical risk and failing to organize around a threat that has already materialized.

    DOJ was dealing with the latter.

    Immigration judges were already being targeted

    During the current audit, DOJ told investigators about UTS-related incidents involving immigration judges overseeing cases handled by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

    Individuals had gathered publicly available but sensitive information about judges from disparate sources and published it in ways that could be used for intimidation or other purposes.

    The response required coordination among DOJ security personnel, the U.S. Marshals Service and, sometimes, the FBI.

    EOIR also employed a privacy and data-removal service to try to remove judges’ personal information from the internet.

    That episode is particularly important because it demonstrates the defining characteristic of UTS.

    The information does not necessarily have to begin as secret.

    The danger comes from aggregation.

    Take pieces of information that are individually public or innocuous, connect them, and something considerably more sensitive can emerge.

    Which brings us back to Table 2.

    About that table

    On page three of the publicly released report sits a table.

    Its title is redacted.

    Its column headings are redacted.

    Its row labels are redacted.

    Its substantive entries are redacted.

    Even the source printed beneath the table is redacted.

    What remains visible is essentially its skeleton: four principal rows, two columns and a collection of bullet points hidden beneath black rectangles.

    The OIG explains on the cover of the report that the complete version contains information the Justice Management Division considered law-enforcement sensitive and that those portions were removed to produce the public version.

    There is nothing inherently scandalous about that.

    Law-enforcement agencies possess information that shouldn’t be publicly released, and Inspector General reports routinely undergo redaction for legitimate reasons.

    But the placement of this particular table was irresistible.

    Immediately before Table 2, the OIG explains that it interviewed personnel from 12 non-law-enforcement components and subcomponents and four law-enforcement components, encompassing another 32 subcomponents. The auditors found a general lack of awareness and understanding of UTS across DOJ, although law-enforcement components were generally more aware of the threat than their non-law-enforcement counterparts.

    Then comes the blacked-out table.

    Immediately afterward, the report concludes that DOJ had taken no enterprise-level action to coordinate its components or actively manage department-wide vulnerabilities.

    Naturally, we wanted to know what was underneath all that black ink.

    So we tried to reconstruct it.

    We failed

    There are important distinctions here.

    Bureaucracy Times did not attempt to remove the PDF’s redactions, exploit hidden document layers, recover deleted text or otherwise circumvent the government’s decision to withhold the material.

    Instead, we tried something considerably less exciting.

    We searched publicly available government records.

    The theory was simple and, appropriately enough, almost identical to the threat described in the report itself: perhaps information appearing separately in other public DOJ, FBI, DEA or OIG records could be combined to independently establish what Table 2 contained.

    We got surprisingly far.

    The public report identifies the organizations auditors interviewed, including ATF, the Bureau of Prisons, DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, National Security Division, Criminal Division, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, Civil Division and EOIR, among others. The FBI was excluded from this particular audit because the OIG had already examined it separately.

    We could establish that DEA’s Defensive Counterintelligence Unit had developed a UTS definition.

    We could establish that EOIR had experienced the immigration-judge incidents.

    We could establish that the Marshals Service participated in responses to those incidents.

    We could establish that DEA, ATF and USMS offered training touching areas relevant to UTS.

    What we could not establish was which organizations corresponded to the four visible rows of Table 2 or precisely what its individual bullet points said.

    There were plausible candidates.

    Plausible isn’t proof.

    So we stopped.

    The black boxes remain black.

    Which rather proves the point

    There is something wonderfully circular about the exercise.

    DOJ’s Inspector General published a report explaining that seemingly ordinary pieces of information can be collected from disparate sources, connected together and used to reveal relationships that aren’t obvious when each piece is viewed independently.

    DOJ then redacted information from that report because it was considered law-enforcement sensitive.

    We received the redacted report because we had subscribed to a public government email list.

    Then we attempted to combine other publicly available government records to determine whether the missing information could independently be reconstructed.

    And we discovered that the public record gets you surprisingly far.

    Just not far enough to responsibly fill in Table 2.

    That may be the most appropriate ending imaginable for an Inspector General report about how much information can be reconstructed from seemingly ordinary pieces of data.

    DOJ agrees changes are needed

    The Justice Department isn’t contesting the Inspector General’s central findings.

    The Justice Management Division’s Security and Emergency Planning Staff concurred with all three recommendations.

    DOJ says it will develop a coordinated UTS strategy and governance framework, establish a structured process for identifying and monitoring risks, maintain a UTS risk portfolio and implement tiered training.

    The Inspector General lists the recommendations as “resolved.”

    That does not mean they’re finished.

    The first recommendation will remain open until the OIG receives evidence that DOJ has actually established the coordinated strategy and assigned responsibility for managing its UTS risk portfolio. The second requires evidence that risks have been identified and mitigation plans developed.

    The third will not close until DOJ demonstrates that it has created and implemented mandatory basic UTS awareness training across the Department, along with advanced training for employees occupying higher-risk positions.

    That gives the Inspector General something concrete to measure later.

    It gives us something to watch, too.

    And if the Department eventually publishes a follow-up explaining how everything turned out, Bureaucracy Times is already subscribed to the newsletter.

    We’ll check Table 2 first.

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  • IRS Warns About Fake ‘Tribal Tax Credits.’ The Public Record Already Names the Promoters.

    The IRS says the credits do not exist and warns taxpayers about unnamed “promoters.” Congressional investigators and SEC filings have been considerably less shy.

    The Internal Revenue Service has a warning for taxpayers: Someone is selling fake “Tribal Tax Credits.”

    The agency’s September 18 alert says promoters are marketing nonexistent federal tax credits under names including “Tribal Tax Credits,” “Native American Tax Credits” and “Sovereign Tribal Tax Credits.” The IRS says no such federal credits exist and warns that taxpayers who claim them could face penalties, interest and even criminal consequences. IRS warning.

    There is just one conspicuous omission from the IRS warning.

    Names.

    The IRS repeatedly refers to “promoters” without identifying the companies or individuals involved.

    Fortunately, other parts of the federal government have been less mysterious.

    In April 2025, Senate Finance Committee investigators publicly identified White River Energy Corp., Nepsis Inc., Nepsis Tax Advisors LLP, Quartermaster Tax, E3 Family Office, Lifetime Advisors and Lifetime Navigators in connection with the promotion or distribution of purported tribal tax credits.

    The committee said the IRS had already confirmed to its investigators that the credits did not exist. Senate Finance Committee.

    That makes the IRS’s decision to issue an anonymous scam warning more than a little curious.

    The Numbers Are Not Small

    White River’s own filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission provide a window into just how ambitious the operation became.

    In December 2023, White River told investors that it had received another $5 billion in federal income tax credits supposedly issued to a Native American tribe. The company claimed the credits had been placed under White River’s name and taxpayer identification number at the U.S. Treasury. SEC filing.

    By February 2024, White River reported an agreement contemplating the acquisition of another $13 billion in purported credits in exchange for $3 million in cash and 10 million restricted shares of White River stock. The company said it had already paid a $1.25 million deposit. SEC filing.

    Then came the sales operation.

    In April 2024, White River announced plans to sell $5 billion of purported credits in three tranches. The first $2.5 billion would sell for 50 cents on the dollar. Another $1.5 billion would go for 55 cents. The final billion would cost 60 cents on the dollar.

    White River also said it possessed a legal opinion from an unidentified law firm supporting the validity of the credits. The company deemed the opinion a “trade secret” and said it would disclose it only to certain prospective purchasers and representatives who signed nondisclosure agreements. SEC filing.

    The IRS now says references to unverifiable legal opinions and demands for nondisclosure agreements are themselves warning signs of the scheme. IRS warning.

    The People Behind the Sales

    White River’s SEC filings also identify executives who stood to benefit directly from selling the credits.

    In April 2024, the company’s board increased annual base salaries for CEO Randy May and CFO Jay Puchir to $1 million each. Both executives also became eligible for royalties equal to 1 percent of gross proceeds from tax-credit sales. SEC filing.

    Six months later, White River doubled those royalties to 2 percent each. Directors James Cahill, Danny Hames and Greg Landis were each granted royalties equal to 0.33 percent of gross proceeds from future sales. SEC filing.

    The distribution network extended beyond White River.

    Senate Finance investigators said a whistleblower identified Lifetime founder Jon LaCasse and his daughter, Payton LaCasse, as personally pitching the credits. Investigators also independently confirmed that Lifetime’s website hosted Nepsis promotional materials concerning the credits. Senate Finance Committee.

    The Senate investigation later obtained a recording of a call between Puchir and more than 100 investors. According to the committee, White River could not provide investors with a definitive government document or government contact capable of authenticating the credits. Senate Finance Committee.

    By January 2026, Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden said White River was under a DOJ criminal tax investigation involving its sales of the purported credits. The committee also accused the company of failing to disclose that investigation in required SEC reports. Those are congressional allegations; a criminal investigation itself is not a finding of guilt. Senate Finance Committee.

    So Why Doesn’t the IRS Name Them?

    That brings us back to September 2026.

    The IRS warns taxpayers that promoters may claim secret government agreements exist. It warns about credits sold at steep discounts. It warns about unverifiable legal opinions. It warns about nondisclosure agreements. And it warns that previously accepted tax returns do not prove the credits were legitimate.

    The agency even provides instructions for reporting abusive promoters.

    What it doesn’t provide is the identity of any promoter.

    That might be understandable if federal investigators were still trying to determine who was selling these products. But the public record tells a different story.

    Congress publicly identified companies connected to the promotion of the credits in April 2025. SEC filings identify White River executives and directors who received compensation tied to their sale. Congressional investigators identified individual sales activity. And by January 2026, a Senate committee was publicly discussing a Justice Department criminal investigation.

    Yet when the IRS issued its nationwide scam warning eight months later, the people it warned Americans about became simply “promoters.”

    There may be a legal, investigative or procedural reason the IRS declined to identify them. The agency’s alert does not explain one.

    The IRS has now told taxpayers what to look for.

    The public record tells them where some of those warning signs have already appeared.

    Bureaucracy Times will continue examining that record.

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  • The Pentagon Audited Its Clocks. Everything Interesting Is Classified.

    The Pentagon’s inspector general recently released an audit concerning the security of the military’s clocks.

    Then it classified essentially everything interesting about it.

    All 10 recommendations in the September 9 audit are classified. No redacted public version of the report is available. What remains publicly visible is little more than the title, administrative metadata and one particularly intriguing fact…the investigation began because somebody made allegations to the Department of Defense Hotline.

    These, however, are not ordinary clocks.

    The Military Has Some Very Important Clocks

    Defense Regional Clocks are part of the Pentagon’s Critical Time Dissemination program, a geographically distributed precision-timing capability intended to keep mission-critical systems synchronized when normal external timing sources are degraded or unavailable.

    The Defense Department created the Critical Time Dissemination effort after recognizing the vulnerability created by dependence on the Global Positioning System. Modern military operations rely on precise positioning, navigation and timing for far more than telling soldiers what time it is. Communications networks, navigation systems, sensors and other systems can depend on extraordinarily precise synchronization.

    The clocks therefore provide part of the resilience needed when GPS or other timing sources are disrupted, jammed, spoofed or lost.

    That makes an audit of their security controls considerably less whimsical than its title initially suggests.

    A Program Years in the Making

    The Critical Time Dissemination program traces back to a fiscal 2012 Defense Department decision intended to address vulnerabilities associated with reliance on GPS.

    Its rollout was not particularly clocklike.

    Defense Department performance records show Defense Regional Clock installation at 63 percent in 2018 and 85 percent in 2019. The department expected to reach 100 percent installation in fiscal 2021.

    It did not.

    During fiscal 2020, installation remained at 87 percent through all four quarters. Subsequent Defense Department planning documents continued moving the finish line, eventually targeting completion of initial operational capability by the end of fiscal 2024.

    The publicly stated schedule therefore appears to have slipped roughly three years from the earlier fiscal 2021 target.

    GAO Finds an Incomplete Business Case

    The deployment history was not the only warning sign in the public record.

    In 2022, the Government Accountability Office examined several Defense Department programs intended to provide alternatives to GPS-based positioning, navigation and timing. Critical Time Dissemination was among them.

    GAO reported that the Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer planned to transition Critical Time Dissemination into the major capability acquisition pathway. But several pieces of its acquisition business case were still unfinished. Requirements were being drafted, and although a technology-risk assessment had been completed, an acquisition strategy, schedule-risk assessment and independent cost estimate had not.

    GAO’s formal business-case recommendation concerned Navy alternative-PNT programs rather than Critical Time Dissemination specifically. But the review nevertheless documented that, roughly a decade after the program began, CTD still lacked several elements of a complete acquisition business case.

    Then the Modernization Became Classified

    Classification surrounding the clock program did not begin with the inspector general’s latest audit.

    DISA’s fiscal 2023 budget justification included a $10 million increase for “Critical Time Dissemination Defense Regional Clocks Modernization.”

    The public explanation for the increase consisted of one word: “Classified.”

    That does not necessarily indicate anything improper. Military timing infrastructure has obvious national-security implications, and publishing technical vulnerabilities, architecture or precise capabilities could itself create risk.

    But then somebody called the Hotline.

    The Hotline Allegation

    On February 20, 2025, the DoD Office of Inspector General announced an audit of security controls protecting Defense Regional Clocks.

    The project announcement was unusually explicit about why the audit existed: “We are initiating the subject audit in response to allegations to the DoD Hotline.”

    The publicly stated objective was to determine whether security controls protecting the clocks were effective.

    The announcement directed work toward the Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer, the U.S. Naval Observatory, the Defense Information Systems Agency and selected Defense Regional Clock locations. It also instructed participating organizations to identify both a knowledgeable GS-15-equivalent point of contact and a Senior Executive Service or General/Flag Officer familiar with DRC security who could engage with senior OIG leadership if necessary.

    The allegation itself remains out of public view. The available records do not identify who made it, what specific weakness was alleged or when the underlying concern first arose.

    What Happened While OIG Was Looking?

    This is where the public chronology becomes particularly interesting.

    While the OIG audit was underway, Defense Department budget and procurement records began describing substantial additional work involving the timing infrastructure.

    DISA’s fiscal 2027 procurement justification requests more than $20 million for Critical Time Dissemination, including nearly $14 million for a Monitor and Control capability covering 46 Defense Regional Clocks and 30 Timing and Synchronization Support Center suites.

    The budget document contains a revealing description of the existing architecture: “The DRCs and TSSCs are currently independent and there is no existing connective network.”

    The proposed capability would connect the systems for centralized calibration and monitoring.

    Other fiscal 2027 budget material describes funding for a permanent test laboratory supporting system optimization and security compliance, anti-spoofing technology upgrades, GPS-independent time-holding capabilities and additional personnel.

    Those personnel would help inspect, operate and upgrade the globally deployed systems and maintain a watch-floor presence monitoring mission-critical timing assets.

    In June 2026, meanwhile, the Navy sought a firmware upgrade from FEI-Zyfer for 50 Time and Frequency Reference Measurement Systems supporting the Critical Time Dissemination project at the U.S. Naval Observatory. Procurement records describe capabilities involving additional external timing inputs, processing multiple streams, weighting and prioritizing timing sources and seamless failover.

    There is currently no public evidence establishing that these subsequent upgrades resulted from the Hotline allegations or from findings developed during the OIG audit.

    The timing is noteworthy, but chronology is not causation.

    What the documents do provide is a before-and-after silhouette worth examining further.

    Ten Recommendations, Ten Secrets

    On September 9, 2026, the DoD OIG finally released the audit.

    Sort of.

    Oversight.gov lists 10 recommendations associated with the audit. All 10 are classified. All 10 are listed as open. The OIG says the report contains classified information and that no redacted version is available.

    The public can therefore establish that allegations were made, that the inspector general considered them sufficient to initiate an audit of security controls, that the audit ran for roughly 19 months and that it resulted in 10 recommendations requiring corrective action.

    What the public cannot establish is what OIG found.

    The Record That Classification Can’t Erase

    There may be entirely legitimate national-security reasons why the vulnerabilities identified by the inspector general cannot be made public. Publishing locations, architectures or exploitable weaknesses in military timing infrastructure would hardly constitute responsible transparency.

    But classification does not make the surrounding public record disappear.

    That record shows a military timing program created to reduce dependence on GPS; a deployment that missed earlier completion targets; an acquisition effort that GAO found was still missing several business-case elements years after the program began; classified modernization spending; a subsequent Hotline allegation concerning security controls; and, while the resulting audit was underway, plans for centralized monitoring, security-compliance testing, anti-spoofing improvements, additional personnel and firmware upgrades.

    None of that tells us what the Hotline complainant alleged.

    It tells us why the question is worth asking.

    Someone saw enough of a problem with the Defense Regional Clock program to contact the Defense Department Hotline. The inspector general considered the allegations sufficient to launch an audit. That audit ultimately produced 10 recommendations.

    The public is permitted to know that much.

    What happened in between remains classified.

    Bureaucracy.news is continuing to examine the contracting, deployment and security history of the Defense Regional Clock program and the circumstances surrounding the Hotline allegations that prompted the audit.